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STUDENT REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT:
ON A COLLISION COURSE?
ROBERT
I.

M. HARDAWAY*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE PAST TWENTY YEARS HAVE SEEN THE RAPID EXPANSION of clinical
legal education programs around the country.' Roughly paralleling
such expansion has been the broadening of the right to counsel under the
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver, College of Law. J.D., New York
University; B.A., New York University.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Heather Stengel, Todd
Vriesman, Jim Pope, and Alexis Holdman in the preparation of materials used in
this article.
See COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

(CLEPR), SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1978-1979
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CLEPR, SURVEY]. CLEPR's 1978-79 statistics reveal a
dramatic increase in the number of clinical programs over the past decade:
Although there has been an increase of only 34% in terms of the
number of schools reporting clinical participation that figure now
represents 80% of the ABA approved law schools in the country (the
true figure is probably closer to 90%) which engage in some form of
clinical training. But perhaps the more interesting, and important figure
is the one which shows an increase of 185% in the number of clinical programs being offered in law schools over the past ten years. That statistic
is most significant in terms of what it says about the depth of commitment on the part of law schools to clinical legal education. Simply put, it
means that a number of law schools have moved beyond the stage when
they offered one clinical course in order to soothe collective faculty consciences and quiet consumer demand in an effort to adequately meet the
skills training needs of law students. The depth of this commitment is
further evidenced by the exponential growth in the fields of law that are
now being covered in clinical programs. It was important for clinical
legal education to break the "mold" of indigent and prisoner representation and move to other areas of the law. With a realization that clinical
training lends itself to a host of substantive legal areas will also come an
effort to further mainstream clinical legal education into the law school
curriculum.
Id. at xxi.
For a comprehensive history of clinical education in the United States, see
Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC.
162 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Grossman]. See also Brickman, CLEPR and
ClinicalEducation: A Review and Analysis, in CLEPR, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR
THE LAW STUDENT 56-93 (1973). For descriptions of various established clinical
programs see generally UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE (1970). For a discussion of the law
schools which have established clinical programs, see Appendix, Selected Summaries of Law School ClinicalPrograms, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 735 (1980).
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sixth amendment of the United States Constitution as mandated by
Gideon v. Wainwright' and Argersinger v. Hamlin.' In many ways the

broadening of the right to counsel has accelerated the development of
new clinical programs, and reinforced the status and position of existing ones.4
At least three members of the United States Supreme Court have
expressly recognized the potential of student representation of indigent defendants in criminal actions,' although stopping short of actually
legitimizing the use of student representation in situations requiring
2

372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel guaranteed in felony proceedings).

1 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel guaranteed in any proceeding where
incarceration possible, including misdemeanors). For an excellent history of the

sixth amendment, see S.

KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D. ROSSMAN, P. FROYD &

J.

HOFF-

(1976) [hereinafter cited as KRANTZ].
For an often cited history of the sixth amendment prior to 1932, see Mr. Justice
Sutherland's excellent discussion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For a
modern history see Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See also Frankfurter &
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 976 (1926); Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26
U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (1959); Note, People v. Perez: Misapplication of the Right to
Counsel, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 545 (1979).
' See CLEPR SURVEY, supra note 1. See generally J. KLEIN, S. LELEIKO & J.
MAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES

MAVITY,

BAR

ADMISSION RULES AND STUDENT
KLEIN]; KRANTZ, supra note 3,

[hereinafter cited as

PRACTICE

RULES

(1978)

at 274; Clark, Problems of

Change, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 347; Cohen, The University of Texas Clinical Justice
Project: An Example of Involvement and Clinical Training, 41 U. COLO. L. REV.
438 (1969); Pincus, The Clinical Component in University ProfessionalEducation,
32 OHIO ST. L.J. 283 (1971); Sacks, Remarks on Involvement and Clinical Training, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 452 (1969); Vetri, Educating the Lawyer: Clinical Experience as an Integral Part of the Legal Education, 50 ORE. L. REV. 57 (1970);
Documentary Supplement, Student Practice as a Means of Providing Legal
Assistance to Indigents: An EmpiricalStudy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363 (1973);
CLEPR, Argersinger v. Hamlin: The Challenge to the Law Schools, CLEPR
NEWSLETTER No. 4, at 1 (1972).
In his concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, Justice Brennan, with
whom Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart joined, stated: "I think it plain that
law students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively
and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in many areas, including cases
reached by today's decision." 407 U.S. at 41. At least one court of appeals judge
has voiced similar sentiments, in the area of prisoner counseling. In United
States v. Simpson, Judge Leventhal stated: "Use of law students to counsel and
advise with prisoners, commended by the ABA report, may well provide the
key toward serving a need without excessive drain on community resources."
United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Contra MILLER,
CLINICAL EDUCATION: WORKING PAPERS: "We are also skeptical about the use of
legal clinics as a panacea for the provision of legal services to substantial strata
and interests in our society which presently lack access to representation by
counsel. The responsibility for making real the guarantees of Gideon v. Wainwright . . . and Argersinger v. Hamlin ... must remain the responsibility of the
legal profession itself." Id. at 101.
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effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment. The availability of willing and able student defenders in established clinical programs has the potential to increase the manpower pool of "Gideon's
Army,"' thereby removing many of the barriers to the expansion of the
right to counsel.7
Although the underlying constitutional parameters of the sixth
amendment seem to be established, much remains to be clarified in the
area of student practice.8 The expansion of clinical education and the
promulgation of student practice rules continues unabated9 although at
' See Monaghan, Gideon's Army: Student Soldiers, 45 B.U. L. REV. 445
[hereinafter cited as Monaghan] (the question of whether students can and should
be part of the army committed to carrying out the mandate of Gideon is discussed). See also Brown, The Trumpet Sounds: Gideon-A First Call to the Law
School, 43 TEx. L. REV. 312 (1964).
In his concurring opinion in Argersinger, Justice Powell observed:
[I]t
is doubtful that the States possess the necessary resources to
meet this sudden expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States the rule the
Court today adopts, recognized that the consequences could be far
reaching....
Recognizing implicitly that, in many sections of the country, there
simply will not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand either
in the short or long term, the Solicitor General speculated whether
"clergymen, social workers, probation officers, and other persons of that
type" could be used "as counsel in certain types of cases involving
relatively small sentences." Quite apart from the practical and political
problem of amending the law of each of the 50 States which require a
license to practice law, it is difficult to square this suggestion with the
meaning of the term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law.
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the new rule which
so concerned the Solicitor General is not reassuring. In a footnote, it said
that there are presently 355,200 attorneys and that the number will
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to be sufficient to
provide the number of full-time counsel, estimated by one source at
between 1,575 and 2,300, to represent all indigent misdemeanants,
excluding traffic offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 355,200
lawyers are potentially available....
There is an additional problem. The ability of various States and
localities to furnish counsel varies widely. Even if there were adequate
resources on a national basis, the uneven distribution of these
resources-of lawyers, of facilities, and available funding- presents the
most acute problem.
407 U.S. at 55-59 (Powell, J., concurring)
8 See notes 163-220 infra and accompanying text.
As of 1978, according to Klein, supra note 4, compilation at 960-69, fortyseven states and the District of Columbia permit some form of student practice:
Alabama, Rule For Legal Internship by Law Students in Alabama;
Alaska, Alaska Bar Rule IV-44; Arizona, Supreme Court Rule 28(e);
Arkansas, Rule XII of the Rules Regulating the Practice of Law; California, State Bar Rules; Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-1-19 (1963), Rule of
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a slower pace than in the late sixties and early seventies. Yet, the constitutional ramifications of student representation have been largely
unexplored." The few cases that have explored the issue have raised
more questions than they have answered."
Civil Proc. 226; Connecticut, Rules for the Superior Court § 42A;
Delaware, Supreme Court Rule 55, Board of Bar Examiners BR-55.2,
55.3; District of Columbia, Court of Appeals Rule 46, III, Superior Court
Crim. Civ. Rule 44-1(f); Florida, Article XVIII of the Integration Rule of
the Florida Bar; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-401.1, 9-401.2 (1973);
Hawaii, Supreme Court Rule 25; Idaho, Supreme Court and State Bar
Rule 123; Illinois, Supreme Court Rule 711; Indiana, Supreme Court
Admission and Discipline Rule 2.1; Iowa, Supreme Court Rule 120; Kansas, Supreme Court Rule 215; Kentucky, Court of Appeals Rule 2.540;
Louisiana, Supreme Court Rule XX; Maine, Supreme Judicial Court Civ.
Pro. Rule 90, Crim Pro. Rule 62, M.R.S.A. Title 4 § 807; Maryland Court
of Appeals Rule 18; Massachusetts, Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:11;
Michigan, Administrative Rule GCR 921; Minnesota, Supreme Court
Rules on Certified Law Students, Rule 1; Mississippi, MISS. CODE, Art. 5;
Missouri, Supreme Court Rule 13; Montana, Montana Student Practice
Rule; Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-101.01, Supreme Court Rule, Legal
Practice by Approved Senior Law Students; Nevada, No Rule; New
Hampshire, Supreme Court Rule 23; New Jersey, New Jersey Rules of
Court 1:21-3(c); New Mexico, Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure
#84; New York, N.Y. JUDIc. LAW §§ 478, 484; North Carolina, Supreme
Court Rules Governing Practical Training of Law Students (Appendix
IX-A); North Dakota, Supreme Court Rule Limited Practice of Law by
Law Students; Ohio, Supreme Court Rule II; Oklahoma, Rules of the
Supreme Court on Legal Internship; Oregon, Supreme Court Rules for
Admission of Attorneys in Oregon: Law Student Appearances 8.05-8.35;
Pennsylvania, Supreme Court Rule 11; Puerto Rico, Rules-and Regulations of the Supreme Court, 11(e); Rhode Island, No Rule; South
Carolina, Supreme Court Rule 12; South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 16-18-2.1 et.seq.; Tennessee, Supreme Court Rule 37 § 19; Texas,
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Art. 320q-1 (Supp. 1975); Rules and Regulations Governing the Participation of Qualified Law Students . . .in the
Trial of Cases; Utah, Supreme Court Law Student Assistance Rule; Vermont, No Rule; Virginia, Supreme Court Third Year Student Practice
Rule, Paragraph 15 of § IV of the Rules for the Integration of the Bar;
Washington, Supreme Court Rule 9: West Virginia, Supreme Court of
Appeals Rule 6.000: Wisconsin, Supreme Court Rules for the Practical
Training of Law Students: Wyoming, Supreme Court Rule 18, Right to
Practice Law.
Id. See also Appendix, Summary of Student PracticeRules, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
817 (1980).
0 See Professor Monaghan's
discussion in which he anticipated potential
sixth amendment problems in the area of student representation, but concluded
that the Roxbury Student Defender Program as it existed in 1965 posed "no
threat to the policies which lie at the core of the requirement of 'assistance of
counsel.'" Monaghan. supra note 6,at 457. See also KRANTZ, supra note 3 at
381-93; Note, People v. Perez: Misapplicationo.f
the Right to Counsel, 6 PEPPER
DINE L. REV. 545 (1979).
" See, e.g.. People v. Perez. 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978),
rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 133. 594 P.2d 1. 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979); State v. Daniels, 346
So.2d 672 (La. 1977): People v. Masonis. 50 Mich. App. 615, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975).
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A resolution of the constitutional questions surrounding student
representation would be of benefit to clinical programs around the country in managing resources and formulating programs, as well as to
courts and agencies responsible for carrying out the mandates of Gideon
and Argersinger. More importantly, a resolution of the constitutional
problems of student representation is needed to prevent an ultimate collision between clinical legal education as it is practiced today, and the
Gideon and Argersinger mandates.2
This article will review the parallel patterns of development of
clinical education and the sixth amendment, highlighting areas in which
the practices of the former either conflict, or contain the potential for
conflict with the latter. An analysis will be made of the present legal
status of law student representation of indigent criminal defendants,
with reference primarily to constitutional and sixth amendment considerations, but also to such related matters as the confidentiality of
student-client communications, law student professional responsibility,
" A minor collision of this very sort has already occurred in California. In
People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978), rev'd, 24 Cal. 2d 133,
594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979), a California appellate court agreed with the
assertion of the defendant, convicted of burglary, that his representation by a
certified third-year law student denied him the right to effective assistance of
counsel, even though the student was under the supervision of a public defender.
The law student had conducted Perez's entire defense, including direct and crossexamination, objections, motions, and closing arguments to the jury. In addition,
the court found that the student's actions constituted the unauthorized practice
of law.
The appellate court's decision caused considerable consternation, confusion
and glum predictions of the demise of clinical education. See, e.g., Note, People v.
Perez: Misapplication of the Right to Counsel, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 545 (1979):
People v. Perez represents the strongest attack against the use of
law students in the judicial process since the inception of Clinical Law in
1957. If this decision is given its fullest interpretation, it will denote
California law students to passive onlookers in their respective clinical
law programs. In its most diluted form, it will effectively prohibit any
law student from participation in criminal defense.
Id. at 546.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, the defendant's assent to law student representation was stressed, as was the valuable service provided to the
community by the student internship program. The California Supreme Court,
with one judge dissenting, reversed the intermediate appellate decision, People
v. Perez 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979), and reaffirmed the
viability of the California program.
Ironically, when the California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision, and upheld the constitutionality of student representation, a student
critic called the decision a "step backward." Note, People v. Perez: Constitutional

Implication of Law Student Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants, 13
J. MAR. L. REv. 461, 484 (1980). This student critic viewed student representation
as permitting a defendant to be "used as a test case in which the student is
allowed to make his first mistake to the detriment of those least likely to protect
the poor." Id. at 482.
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and the applicability to students of state bar disciplinary rules. Finally,
guidelines will be proposed regarding the proper scope of student practice and methods by which student representation of indigent defendants can be brought into compliance with the sixth amendment.
II.

CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION

A.

Legal Education (1870-1980)

A history of clinical education cannot be divorced from the history
and the development of legal education in its broader context. In 1870,
Dean Langdell of Harvard Law School initiated the case method of
instruction to replace a legal educational system in which law schools
served more as adjuncts to apprenticeship programs than as selfcontained and independent institutions of learning. 3 The changes in
teaching methodology were profound. 4 No longer were students
instructed in the law from ponderous treatises as a supplement to actual
apprenticeship training." Rather, students "gleaned" the law by
reading, analyzing, and dissecting selected appellate opinions, and
engaging in so-called socratic dialogue.
Although parallel apprentice programs continued to function," the
expansion of legal education and the trend toward more uniform educational standards relegated apprenticeship to the back alleys of legal
education. To the Langdellians, the bumbling local court hall practitioners would be no match for these titans of the case method system,
trained in the great universities, renowned for their scholarship and
steel-trap intellects and honed on the exercise of superior socratic
skills."
The demise of the apprenticeship system, however, left a void in the
minds of some reformers. 8 In 1933, Jerome Frank attacked the case
method, charging that "the spirit of Langdell has resulted in sterilizing
or numbing the teaching value of even the most experienced men."' 9
"

See Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 908

(1933) [hereinafter cited as Frank, ClinicalLawyer].
" See Grossman, supra note 1, at 162-66.
" See generally Grossman, supra note 1, at 163-65.

" See generally P. Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education:

Why Has It Failed?, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE
FUTURE 54, 57 (Kitch ed. 1970).
" See generally Frank, ClinicalLawyer, supra note 13, at 908-09.
See Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A.J. 723
(1934) (reprinted address before ABA Section on Legal Education at Grand
Rapids, Mich., Aug. 29, 1933) [hereinafter cited as Frank, Legal Education];
Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong With So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 651 (1935); Llewellyn, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 345 (1945).
'" Frank, Clinical Lawyer, supra note 13, at 915 n.8. Frank made no effort to
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Frank proposed "a complete abandonment of Langdell's central aim
and a reversion to the apprentice system but on a more sophisticated
level."2 According to Frank, attempting to teach a law student the law
by compelling him to read appellate decisions was like learning to play
golf "by having the teacher talk about golf to the prospective player
2
and having the latter read a book relating to the subject." '
Frank's view-that law schools should "once more get in intimate
contact with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers actually do" 2 2- has been articulated by many latter-day critics. Chief Justice
Warren Burger stated in 1969 that "[tihe shortcoming in today's law
graduate lies not in any deficient knowledge of law but that he has little, if any, training in dealing with facts or people-the stuff of which
cases are really made."23
When Langdellians defended that lack of practical legal training in
the law school on the ground that such training was available upon
employment by a firm, one reformer responded:
Most law offices do not furnish a neophyte with beginner's
instructions; they don't send him to court with a supervisor,
then post-mortem his performance, then send him again if he
did badly

....

Lawyers who hang up their own shingle are con-

demned to stagger their way through whatever business comes
their way-and suffer the disasters of their untutored
mistakes24

hide his feelings about Professor Langdell's qualification as a legal educator:
When Langdell was himself a law student he was almost constantly
in the law library. His fellow students said of him that he slept on the
library table. At that time he served for several years as an assistant
librarian. One of his friends found him one day in an alcove of the library
absorbed in a black-letter folio, one of the year books. "As he drew
near," we are told, "Langdell looked up and said, in a tone of mingledexhilaration and regret, and with an emphatic gesture, 'Oh, if only I
could have lived in the time of the Plantaganets!"'
He practiced law in New York City for sixteen years. But he seldom
tried a case. He spent most of his time in the library of the New York
Law Institute. He led a peculiarly secluded life. His biographer says of
him: "In the almost inaccessible retirement of his office, and in the
library of the Law Institute, he did the greater part of his work. He
went little into company." His clients were mostly other lawyers for
whom, after much lucubration, he wrote briefs or prepared pleadings.
Id. at 907-08.
20 Frank, Legal Education, supra note 18, at 723.
21 Id.

at 724.

Frank, Clinical Lawyer, supra note 13, at 913.
W. Burger, The Future of Legal Education, in A.B.A., SELECTED READINGS
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 49, 55 (1973).
23

IN

24

Conrad, Letter From the Law Clinic, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 194, 197 (1974).
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Defenders of the Langdell case method staunchly opposed practical
training as a threat to academic responsibility:
Most importantly. the "how to of thinking" rather than the
"how to of doing" must be the principal concern of legal education. Case study, problems analysis and exposition, a search for
basic values and abstract principles of law, are clearly more
important and more within the practical competence of law
schools than the knowledge of where to file what in order to
perfect a lien.25
By the early 1950's, Frank's crusade for practical learning had been
taken up by such critics as Arch Cantrall. He urged law schools to at
least teach the basic and more specific skills of lawyering such as examining a title, drafting a will, or closing a real estate transaction."
By the early 1960's, clinical education began to emerge in a form
which enabled law schools to avoid having to totally accept or reject
the Frank and Cantrell criticisms of legal education.27
25 Wote, Modern Trends in Legal Education, 64 COLuM. L. REV. 710, 721
(1964). Dean Charles Clark, Professor and Dean of Yale Law School 1919-1939,
and later a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
also urged resistance to the pressures for practical training. In a letter prepared
at the request of the chairman of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions
of the American Bar Association for a representation at the meeting of the section in Washington in September 1950, Dean Clark stated:
I regard the repetitive attempts to coerce law schools into offering socalled practical training as at best curiously naive, and in general at odds

with sound concepts of legal education.... Nor does it seem likely that

we in law can reproduce conditions of practice in our training department at all comparable to those of the great medical school with their
attached hospitals. One cannot expect, for example, that the public will
allow official trials, civil or criminal, to become adjuncts of school training.
Clark, "Practical"Legal Training: An Illusion, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 424, 425 (1951)
(reprinted address).
2 Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?,
38 A.B.A.J. 907, 909 (1952).
7 See Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR),
Student Practice: A Commentary, in STATE RULES PERMITTING THE STUDENT
PRACTICE OF LAW: COMPARISONS AND COMMENTS 1-7 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as CLEPR, COMPARISONS].

The attempt to find a "middle ground" for clinical education has caused some
friction. CLEPR's 1979 report notes that reaction of some members of the Harvard Law Faculty to a HarvardLaw Record special committee report:
ITIhere was some expression of concern by some members of the

Harvard Faculty that any attempt to recruit professors for clinical programs may shift the balance of the faculty from an academic to 'practica'
mode-a reaction which may be questioned in view of what some have
called the second-class status of clinical teachers because the law schools
all too often do not grant tenure or its equivalent to clinical teachers.
E. Goe, Survey of Clinical Education, in CLEPR, SURVEY, supra note 1, at xviii.
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The Law School Clinic (1958-1980)

In 1904, the University of Denver College of Law in Colorado
established a legal clinic2" pursuant to the nation's first and most
liberal student practice rule.29 Although the roots of modern, clinical
11 The Denver University Law School Dispensary was established in the Fall
Term of 1904. The 1906 University of Denver Yearbook (1906) states:
During the first seven months of the school year the dispensary has
had, from worthy persons, ninety-eight applications, all of which have
been handled successfully. Nearly one-third of the cases have gone to
trial, resulting in a large majority of victories for the Dispensary. The
total number of cases handled by the Dispensary for the year will reach
one hundred and fifty. Only meritorious cases of poor persons who are
unable to pay attorney's fees are taken. No fee is charged for services
and only actual court costs are collected.
The student is given the case on the first application for aid and
handles it from the outset. He learns how to meet a client, to draw from
him the vital facts of a case and sift out what is essential from a mass of
confused, chaotic facts. The Dispensary is conducted on systematic lines,
so that the student learns the most approved methods, the careful and
accurate way of handling professional business. He must also prepare his
evidence for trial, secure witnesses of papers and pleadings, and the
learning of how to get into court. In the larger cases briefs are prepared
and often the student can cope with experienced lawyers.
Lastly comes the trial in which the student gains practical knowledge
and practical experience at every step, matching his powers against
trained lawyers, examining and cross-examining witnesses and getting
rid of the nervousness that usually troubles the young lawyer.
It is indeed an invaluable training school of legal experience, and
several of the large law schools of the United States and Canada have
written regarding it.
The Dispensary is no longer an experiment: it is approved success,
and during the coming year its work will be broadened and strengthened. It makes the Denver University Law School unique in its
superiority over other law schools.
KYNEWISBOK (1906), reprintedin DEN. U. COL. OF L., ADVOCACY SKILLS BULLETIN 1
(1980).
The present Colorado Statute, § 12-5-116 provides:

Legal aid dispensaries-law student practice. Students of any law
school which has been continuously in existence for at least ten years
prior to April 23, 1909, and which maintains a legal-aid dispensary where
poor persons receive legal advice and services shall, when representing
said dispensary and its clients and then only, be authorized to appear in
court as if licensed to practice.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-5116 (1963).
The Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure also provides:
Students of any accredited Colorado law school which maintains a
legal aid dispensary where poor persons receive legal advice and services, shall, when representing said dispensary and its clients, and then
only, be authorized to appear in district, county, and municipal courts of
the state as if licensed to practice; provided such representation shall be
with the approval of the lawyers in charge of the said legal aid clinic,
and the judge of the court in which the student appears.
COLO. R. Civ. P. 226
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legal education can be traced to this program, the history of clinical
legal education really began in 1957 when additional states began promulgating student practice rules." Because the progress of establishing clinics was slow, many law students made use of existing rules to
volunteer their services through extracurricular activities under the
aegis of legal aid and Office of Economic Opportunity programs." A
Ford Foundation grant made possible the formation of a National
Council on Legal Clinics. 2 In 1968, the Council of Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) was created with another generous grant from the Ford Foundation. CLEPR was instrumental in the
establishment and support of clinical education programs at law
schools throughout the country. By 1979, approximately eighty percent
of the ABA approved law schools reported that they had some form of
34
clinical education.
Even though many law schools were establishing clinical programs,
true integration of these programs into the traditional law school curriculum was rare. Often, the result was a clinical program attached to,
but not really part of, the law school-the proverbial "orphan child. 35
The hiring of untenured supervisors, with little or no job security, and
the segregation of clinical activities and facilities from the regular
law school curriculum gave rise to a new modus vivendi. Clinical
education was given money and support to operate, and the academic
curriculum was left unmolested by clinical contaminants-in short,
separate and unequal. 6
" Leleiko, State FederalRules Permitting the Student Practiceof Law: Comparisons and Comments, reprinted in KLEIN, supra note 4, at 942 n.3.
31

CLEPR,

COMPARISONS,

supra note 27, at 1.

See Sacks, Student Fieldwork as a Technique in Evaluating Law Students
in ProfessionalResponsibility, 20 J. LEGAL EDUc. 291 (1968).
3 Grossman, supra note 1, at 173.
'4 CLEPR, SURVEY, supra note 1, at v. This survey also estimates that at least
32

one half of the twenty percent of law schools not reporting have some sort of
clinical program.
See note 27 supra.
There is a distinction in status between law school staff who are assigned exclusively to supervise students and those individuals who also
have a classroom teaching function at the law school. The distinction
manifests itself in two ways: The first in terms of titles and the second
in terms of tenure opportunities. For example, those individuals who
have exclusive assignments to supervise clinical work are given titles
such as clinical director, clinical coordinator, staff attorney, or instructor. On the other hand, law school staff who have both a supervisory and
a classroom teaching function are most often given traditional academic
titles such as professor, or dean, although there even now continues to
be some tendency to put the word "clinical" in front of more traditional
titles. Perhaps an even more telling distinction in status is that only
17% of those involved exclusively in clinical work are on a tenure producing track. On the other hand, tenure appears to be generally
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This process of compromise all too often resulted in a schizophrenic
distortion of the goals and purposes of legal education. Such goals
must be brought into focus before reasonable standards for student
representation can be established to meet the requirements of the
sixth amendment and the Argersinger mandate.
C.

Student Practice

Although only one state had adopted a student practice program
prior to 1957, by 1978 forty-four states had adopted a student practice
rule permitting some form of student practice in the state courts.
Some form of student practice is also permitted in twenty-four federal
district courts and four U.S. courts of appeal. 8
State and federal courts vary widely in the degree to which they
permit student practice. For example, one of the more liberal student
practice rules permits students of any accredited law school in the
state "which maintains a legal aid dispensary where poor persons
receive legal advice and services" to appear in any of the "district,
county and municipal courts of the state as if licensed to practice," provided only that "such representation .. .be with the approval of the
lawyers in charge of the said legal aid clinic, and the judge of the court
in which the student appears."39 This rule appears to permit a student
to practice in all civil cases and criminal cases up to and including
felony cases without the in-court supervision of a licensed attorney.
Most other states have additional restrictions on student practice
relating to student qualifications, including certification, the nature of
the case, compensation, the extent and nature of licensed attorney
supervision, courtroom presence of the supervisor, supervisor qualifications, and the type of program sponsoring the student." Many states
available to those who have both clinical supervision and classroom
teaching roles in the law school, and is certainly available to traditional
teachers who assume clinical teaching assignments out of interest. This
lack of tenure availability, coupled with other "second class" signals
must certainly be a major factor in the continual turnover among clinicians.
E. Goe, Survey of Clinical Education, in CLEPR, SURVEY, supra note 1, at xviii.
37 KLEIN, supra note 4, at 960-69.
38 Id. at 972-81.
9 See note 29, supra.
40 See KLEIN, supra note 4, at 994. The American Bar Association's Model
Student Practice Rule provides:
Requirements and Limitations. In order to make an appear...III.
ance pursuant to this rule, the law student must: A. Be duly enrolled in
this State in a law school approved by the American Bar Association. B.
Have completed legal studies amounting to at least four (4) semesters, or
the equivalent, if the school is on some basis other than a semester basis.
C. Be certified by the dean of his law school as being of good character
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require that supervising attorneys be personally present during all
trial proceedings conducted by a student.4 1 Other states waive this
requirement if the client represented by the student has no constitional right to counsel,42 or if the lower court specifically agrees to no
and competent legal ability, and as being adequately trained to perform
as a legal intern. D. Be introduced to a court in which he is appearing by
an attorney admitted to practice in that court. E. Neither ask for nor
receive any compensation or remuneration of any kind for his services
from the person on whose behalf he render services, but this shall not
prevent a lawyer, legal aid bureau, law school public defender agency, or
the State from paying compensation to the eligible law student, nor shall
it prevent any agency from making such charges for its services as it
may otherwise properly require.
Certification. The certification of a student by the law school
IV.
dean: A. Shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court and, unless it is
sooner withdrawn, it shall remain in effect until the expiration of eighteen (18) months after it is filed, or until the announcement of the results
of the first bar examination following the students graduation,
whichever is earlier. For any student who passes that examination or
who is admitted to the bar without taking an examination, the certification shall continue in effect until the date he is admitted to the bar. B.
May be withdrawn by the dean at any time by mailing a notice to that
effect to the Clerk of this Court. It is not necessary that the notice state
the cause for withdrawal. C. May be terminated by this Court at any
time without notice or hearing and without any showing of cause.
ABA, MODEL STUDENT PRAC. R. III and IV.
41 See,
e.g., N.D. SuP. CT. RULES-LIMITED PRACTICE OF LAW BY LAW
STUDENTS § II (B): "An eligible law student may also appear in any criminal matter on behalf of the state with written approval of the prosecuting attorney who
shall be personally present throughout the proceedings and shall be fully responsible for the manner in which they are conducted."
42 See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 4, at 1055-56; LA. SUP. CT. R. XX, § 3:
[A]n eligible law student may appear in any court or before any
administrative tribunal in this state on behalf of the state, any political
subdivision thereof, or any indigent person if the person on whose behalf
he is appearing has indicated in writing his consent to that appearance
and the supervising lawyer has also indicated in writing approval of that
appearance, in the following matters: . . . (b) Any criminal matter in
which an indigent defendant does not have the right to the assignment
of counsel under any constitutional provision, statute, or rule of this
court. In such cases the supervising attorney is not required to be personally present in court if the person on whose behalf an appearance is
being made consents to his absence.
The ABA Model Rule provides:
An eligible law student may appear in any court or before any administrative tribunal in this State on behalf of any indigent person if the
person on whose behalf he is appearing has indicated in writing his consent to that appearance, in the following matters:
1. Any civil matter. In such cases the supervising lawyer is not required
to be personally present in court.
2. Any criminal matter in which the defendant does not have the right
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supervision. 3 Elaborate certification procedures for both students and
supervisors have been adopted in many states."
The American Bar Association Model Rule requires the presence of
a supervising attorney in all cases in which the client has a right to
counsel.' In addition, the ABA rule requires that a law student must
have completed four semesters of law school and be certified by the
dean of the law school as being of "good character and competent
legal ability."4 The rule further specifies that the supervising attorney
be approved by the dean of the law school in which the student is
enrolled and that the supervising attorney "assume personal professional responsibility" for the student's guidance. 7 The ABA rule sets
forth no guidelines on student participation in negotiation and counselling. 8

to the assignment of counsel under any constitutional provision, statute,
or rule of this court. In such cases the supervising lawyer is not required
to be personally present in court.
3. Any criminal matter in which the defendant has the right to the
assignment of counsel under any constitutional provision, statute, or
rule of this court. In such cases the supervising lawyer must be personally present thoughout the proceedings.
ABA MODEL STUDENT PRAC. R. § 11 (A).
,8 See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 4, at 1036-37; HAWAII SUP. CT. R. 25.2 (A):
In connection with a clinical program, a law student intern may
appear in any court ... on behalf of a client, provided: (1) that the client
has consented in writing to such appearance; and (2) that a supervising
lawyer has indicated in writing approval of such appearance. In every
such appearance the law student intern shall be accompanied by a supervising lawyer, unless the court or tribunal consents to the law student
intern appearing without a supervising lawyer.
" See note 40 supra ; see also the elaborate certification procedures set forth

in section III of the State Bar of California Rules Governing the Practical Training of Law Students. CALIF. BAR Assoc., RULES GOVERNING THE PRACTICAL
TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS

See note 42 supra.
40 See note 40 supra.
4' ABA MODEL STUDENT

§ 3 (1969).

'

PRAC. R. VI:

The member of the bar under whose supervision an eligible law student does any of the things permitted by this rule shall: A. Be a lawyer
whose service as a supervising lawyer for this program is approved by
the dean of the law school in which the law student is enrolled. B.
Assume personal professional responsibility for the student's guidance
in any work undertaken and for supervising the quality of the student's
work. C. Assist the student in his preparation to the extent the supervising lawyer considers it necessary.
48 But

see, e.g.,

HAWAII SUP. CT.

R. 25, 25.5:

(a) Any law student intern may, with the knowledge and approval of a
supervising lawyer and the client, engage in the following activities: (1)
Counseling and advising clients, interviewing and investigating witnesses, negotiating the settlement of claims, and preparing and drafting
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Parts of the ABA rule have served as a model for the student practice rules of a large number of states, but it is apparent that in such
critical areas as student supervision and the requirement of courtroom
presence by the supervising attorney, the state rules vary considerably. The lack of clear guidance as to the constitutional requirements of student representation no doubt contributes to the wide
disparity in the rules. Although the ABA Model Rule implicitly adopts
the position that student representation outside the presence of a
supervising attorney does not meet the sixth amendment requirement
of right to counsel, the fact that other states permit student representation without courtroom presence of a supervising attorney raises the
question of whether these states are in fact complying with Argersinger in permitting such representation.
III.

SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A.

Before Gideon v. Wainwright

The right to counsel in certain circumstances was recognized both in
England and in the American colonies long before the adoption of the
sixth amendment.49 Two congressional acts, one in 1789,"0 and the other
legal instruments, pleadings, briefs, abstracts and other documents. Any
documents requiring signature of counsel, and any settlement or compromise of a claim, must be signed by a supervising lawyer.
" See generally KRANTZ, supra note 3. The relevance of the historical
development of the right to counsel to a modern analysis has been questioned by
scholars and judges alike. Professor Monaghan, for example, writes:
In seeking to define the content of the sixth amendment's requirement
of "Assistance of Counsel," I doubt that anything of value is to be gained
by rummaging through the writings of the colonial fathers in search of
enlightenment. Nor is anything gained by a minute analysis of the
history of lay representation in the civil or the criminal courts. Meaningful history begins with Powell v. Alabama.
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 458 (citations omitted).
The history of the sixth amendment prior to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1938), seems particularly unhelpful when one realizes that "originally, in
England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel,
except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. At
the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were
entitled to the full assistance of counsel." Id. at 60. In this regard, Justice Rehnquist has noted: "... . we cannot fall back on the common law as it existed prior to
the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely gave less in the way of
right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of misdemeanors." Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979).
For those who desire a good historical summary in a modern constitutional
analysis, the review of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell is still the most often
quoted:
An affirmation of the right to the aid of counsel in petty offenses, and
its denial in the case of crimes of the gravest character, where such aid
is most needed, is so outrageous and so obviously a perversion of all
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sense of proportion that the rule was constantly, vigorously and
sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and lawyers. As
early as 1758, Blackstone, although recognizing that the rule was settled
at common law, denounced it as not in keeping with the rest of the
humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. "For upon what face
of reason," he says, "can that assistance be denied to save the life of a
man, which yet is allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?"
4 Blackstone 355. One of the grounds upon which Lord Coke defended
the rule was that in felonies the court itself was counsel for the prisoner.
[8th ed. 698 et seq]. But how can a judge,
1 Cooley's Const. Lim....
whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge the obligations
of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and
fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused
which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.
... Before the adoption of the federal [sic] Constitution, the Constitution of Maryland had declared "That, in all criminal prosecutions, every
man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel; . . ." (Art. XIX, Constitution
of 1776). The Constitution of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780 (Part. the
First, Art. XII), the Constitution of New Hampshire, adopted in 1784
(Part I, Art XV), the Constitution of New York of 1777 (Art. XXXIV),
and the Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1776 (Art. IX), had also declared
to the same effect. And in the case of Pennsylvania, as early as 1701, the
Penn Charter (Art. V) declared that "all Criminals shall have the same
Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors"; and there
was also a provision in the Pennsylvania statute of May 31, 1718 (Dallas,
Laws of Pennsylvania, 1700-1781, Vol. 1, p. 134), that in capital cases
learned counsel should be assigned to the prisoners.
In Delaware, the Constitution of 1776 (Art. 25), adopted the common
law of England, but expressly excepted such parts as were repugnant to
the rights and privileges contained in the Declaration of Rights; and the
Declaration of Rights, which was adopted on September 11, 1776, provided (Art. 14), "That in all Prosecutions for criminal Offences, every
Man hath a Right . . . to be allowed Counsel, .... " In addition, Penn's
Charter, already referred to, was applicable in Delaware. The original
Constitution of New Jersey of 1776 (Art. XVI) contained a provision like
that of the Penn Charter, to the effect that all criminals should be admitted to the same privileges of counsel as their prosecutors. The original
Constitution of North Carolina (1776) did not contain the guarantee, but
C. 115, § 85, Sess. Laws. N. Car., 1777 (N. Car. Rev. Laws, 1715-1796,
Vol. 1, 316), provided ". . . That every person accused of any crime or
misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to council in all matters
which may be necessary for his defence, as well to facts as to law; ...
"Similarly, in South Carolina the original Constitution of 1776 did not
contain the provision as to counsel, but it was provided as early as 1731
(Act of August 20, 1731, § XLIII, Grimke, S. Car. Pub. Laws, 1682-1790,
p. 130) that every person charged with treason, murder, felony, or other
capital offense, should be admitted to make full defense by counsel learned in the law. In Virginia there was no constitutional provision on the
subject, but as early as August, 1734 (c. VIII, § III, Law of Va., 8th Geo.
II, Hening's Stat. at Large, Vol. 4, p. 404), there was an act declaring
that in all trials for capital offenses the prisoner, upon his petition to the
court, should be allowed counsel.
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in 1790,"' provided for counsel, the latter even providing for assignment of counsel in capital crimes.
In 1938, the Supreme Court, defining the right to counsel in federal
criminal cases, declared in Johnson v. Zerbst52 that:
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost
"in the course of the proceedings" due to the failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who
has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and
whose life or liberty is at stake. 3
In Powell v. Alabama,4 the Supreme Court held that where the circumstances involved a capital crime, and the notice and terms of
appointment were unclear, "the failure of the [state] trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due pro-

cess within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."5 In that case,
The original Constitution of Connecticut (Art I, § 9) contained a provision that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right
to be heard by himself and by counsel"; but this Constitution, was not
adopted until 1818. However, it appears that the English common law
rule had been rejected in practice long prior to 1796. See Zephaniah
Swift's "A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut," printed at
Windham by John Byrne, 1795-1796, Vol. II, Bk. 5, "Of Crimes and
Punishments," c.XXIV, "Of Trials," pp. 398-399.
The original Constitution of Georgia (1777) did not contain a
guarantee in respect of counsel, but the Constitution of 1798 (Art. III, §
8) provided that " . .. no person shall be debarred from advocating or

defending his cause before any court or tribunal, either by himself or
counsel, or both." What the practice was prior to 1798 we are unable to
discover. The first constitution adopted by Rhode Island was in 1842,
and this constitution contained the usual guarantee in respect of the
assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. As early as 1798 it was
provided by statute, in the Federal Constitution, that "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance
of counsel for his defence;

. .

." An Act Declaratory of certain Rights of

the People of this State, § 6, Rev. Pub. Laws, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1798. Furthermore, while the statute itself is not
available, it is recorded as a matter of history that in 1668 or 1669 the
colonial assembly enacted that any person who was indicted might
employ an attorney to plead in his behalf. 1 Arnold, History of Rhode
Island, 336.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1938) (Sutherland, J.).
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (1798).
51Ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
52 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Id. at 468.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5

Id. at 56-57. The Court observed from the record that:
It thus will be seen that until the very morning of the trial no lawyer
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seven young black youths were charged with sexual assault on two
white girls in Alabama. Counsel was appointed immediately before
trial so that there was little time to prepare and in a climate of community hostility, the defendants were subsequently tried and sentenced to death.
Apparently not even considering the possibility that the sixth
amendment in its entirety might be extended to the states via the
fourteenth amendment, the court grappled with the problem of
whether the sixth amendment's right to counsel in specific terms
precluded the application of any right to counsel through the more
general due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although
there was ample authority for the view that the right was not "within
the intendment of the due process of law clause,"56 the Court nevertheless extended some elements of the right to counsel to the states.
had been named or definitely designated to represent the defendants.
Prior to that time, the trial judge had "appointed all the members of the
bar" for the limited "purpose of arraigning the defendants." Whether
they would represent the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared
in their behalf, was a matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of the court. Such a designation,
even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen far short
of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of
counsel.... In any event, the circumstances lend emphasis to the conclusion that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing
investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did
not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
Id.
Id. at 66. Justice Sutherland rejected the contention that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause did not embody the sixth amendment's right to
counsel in regard to state action.
That some such distinction must be observed is foreshadowed in Twin-

ing v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99, where Mr. Justice Moody, speaking
for the court, said that ".

.

. it is possible that some of the personal rights

safeguarded by the first eight amendments against National action may
also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process of law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226. If this is so, it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such
a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law."
While the question has never been categorically determined by this
court, a consideration of the nature of the right and a review of the
expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear that the right to the
aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.
287 U.S. at 67-68.
Id. at 71.
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion-the
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the cir-
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The Powell case was an important turning point in the development
of the right to counsel. It not only recognized a constitutional right to
counsel in capital cases, but for the first time the Supreme Court found
the legal mechanism for extending to the states at least some of the
elements of the sixth amendment, if not the sixth amendment itself.
In the 1941 case of Betts v. Brady,' an indigent defendant was
denied counsel on a felony charge and was sentenced to eight years in
jail after a trial to the court. Without discussion, the Supreme Court
again assumed that the sixth amendment applied only in the federal
courts. As in Powell, however, the court considered the contention
that the sixth amendment nevertheless "expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is
made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment."59
cumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that their friends
and families were all in other states and communication with them was
necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their
lives-we think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable
time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process.
But passing that, and assuming their inability, even if opportunity
had been given, to employ counsel, as the trial court evidently did
assume, we are of opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the
necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the
trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a
denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.
As a general statement, Justice Sutherland's view on the importance of
counsel is often quoted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would
be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.

Id. at 68-69.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).

Id. at 465.
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Rejecting this argument and noting that a great majority of states had
determined that appointment of counsel was "not a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial,"6 the Court held that the due process clause
did not obligate the states to provide counsel in every case requested. 6
This did not mean that the states could deny counsel in every case for
the Court acknowledged that a "denial by a state of rights and priirileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other
elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process
of law in violation of the Fourteenth. 62
In affirming the conviction, the Court distinguished Powell, noting
that there the defendants were "ignorant and friendless negro youths,
strangers in the community, without friends or means to obtain
counsel." 3 Presumably such circumstances were of the special type
which would trigger the right to counsel via the due process clause.
Although the Betts decision suffered extensive abuse at the hands of
critics and commentators, 4 and was later attacked as an "abrupt break
with its own well-considered precedents"6 and an "anachronism when
handed down," 6 it was not, in fact, a major step backward.
Betts was a logical extension of Powell, acknowledging that special
circumstances might exist in a non-capital as well as a capital case.
Certainly there was ample precedent for not incorporating the sixth
amendment into the fourteenth amendment and applying it in its entirety to the States. 7 Indeed, had the Betts Court found special circumstances triggering the right to counsel, Betts would probably be
looked upon today as a logical step in the development of this right. In
fact, in the decade after Betts, there were only a few Supreme Court
cases in which "special circumstances" were not found, and then only
in closely split decisions. By 1963, when Gideon v. Wainwright 9 was
60 Id.

at 471.

61 Id.

62 Id.

at 462.

' Id. at 463.
See, e.g., Kamisar, Betts v. Brady, Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962); Kamisar, The Right
to Counsel and the FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive
Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962); Symposium, The Right to
Counsel, 45 MINN. L. REV. 693 (1961).
65

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

Id. at 345.
8 See Justice Sutherland's discussion of Hurtabo v. California, 110 U.S. 516

(1884), in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
8

See, e.g., Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640

(1948).
69 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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decided, Justice Harlan could not find cases, after 1950, in which the
Court failed to find "special circumstances" in non-capital cases."0
At the time of Gideon, the very notion that a person under any circumstances might lose his liberty without having had the benefit of
the "guiding hand"7 of counsel was repugnant to the human, if not the
legal sensibilities of a growing number of critics, commentators, and
judges. 2
B.

Gideon v. Wainwright73

Gideon v. Wainwright is considered the landmark case in the history
of the right to counsel because it established for the first time a clear
right to counsel standard applicable to the states. In Gideon, the defendant was charged with a felony under Florida law.74 He requested
appointed counsel, but this was refused and he was subsequently convicted. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
incorporating by reference much of its language in prior decisions
recognizing the right to counsel in federal cases." But more importantly, the Court enunciated the basic principle that the right to
counsel under the sixth amendment was a provision of the Bill of
Rights that was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial,"" thereby
requiring that the sixth amendment be made obligatory on the states
through the fourteenth amendment.77
The Court could have taken the view of Justice Harlan that the case
could best be disposed of by abandoning the "special circumstances"
Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). "Special circumstances" were found in
even routine cases on the grounds that complicated issues were present. See,
e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
7

471 (1945).
71 See note 57 supra.
72 See generally Brown, The Trumpet Sounds: Gideon-A First Call to the
Law School, 43 TEX. L. REV. 312 (1965); Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact
of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103 (1970).
7 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.051 (repealed 1974).
372 U.S. at 343 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
7 Id. at 344.
77 Id. The Court noted the cases in which certain Bill of Rights guarantees had
been recognized as being so fundamental so as to make them obligatory on the
states via the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 341 n.4. See Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (speech, assembly, petition for redress of
grievances); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 336 U.S. 293, 296 (1961)

(association); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 488 (1960) (association); Staub
v. City of Baxley, 335 U.S. 313, 321 (1958) (speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (religion); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (speech
and press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (assembly); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (press): Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925) (speech and press).
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rule as applied to non-capital cases, thus giving Betts a "more respectful burial."7 The strong language of the Court in applying the sixth
amendment to the states,"9 however, set the stage for Argersinger and
its determination of the scope of this new right.
C.

Argersinger v. Hamlin"

It is significant that no Justice sitting on the Gideon Court found it
necessary to refer to the financial or practical consequences flowing
from any significant expansion of the right to counsel. The fact that
there was little concern for the practical consequences of extending
the right to counsel to all state felony trials is shown by the fact that
in Gideon, a total of twenty-two states, as friends of the Court, argued
that Betts should be over-ruled, while only two states, in addition to
1 By the time Argersinger
Florida, argued in favor of retaining Betts."
2
v. Hamlin resolved the hotly debated issue of whether the Gideon
mandate applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies, the question of
availability of legal resources was being interjected into the Constitu3

tional discussions.8

372 U.S. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior

cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and
essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however,
in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not
one of these fundamental rights.
Id. at 341.
" Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Prior to Argersinger, specific
elements of the sixth amendment right to counsel had been made applicable to
the States via the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to speedy and public
trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial).
81 372 U.S. 335, 335-36 (1963). The States which argued in favor of retaining
Betts were Alabama and Oregon; only one brief was filed on behalf of the 22
States. In addition the American Civil Liberties Union filed an amici curiae arguing against the retention of Betts. Id.
" 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
13 Justice Powell, concurring in the result in Argersinger, expressed great
concern for the practical consequences of requiring the states to provide indigent
defendants with counsel in misdemeanor cases:
...Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's holding will be
on our already overburdened local courts...
The ability of various States and localities to furnish counsel varies

widely. Even if there were adequate resources on a national basis, the

uneven distribution of these resources-of lawyers, of facilities, and
available funding-presents the most acute problem.
Id. at 58-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell further interjected: "[Tihe successful implementation of the
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The Argersinger case is significant in an analysis of the present
legal status of student representation of indigent defendants for
several reasons. First, the decision came at a time when clinical education at the nation's law schools was expanding rapidly, and when more
student practice rules were being adopted. 4 Second, the decision takes
into account the problem of the availability of legal resources. 5 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, not only acknowledged
the legal resource problem, but specifically suggested that "law students
... may provide an important source of legal representation for the indigent."8
The petitioner in Argersinger was charged with carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor.8' He was not represented by counsel and was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to ninety days in jail. In his writ
of habeas corpus, the defendant argued that without assigned counsel,
he was unable, as an indigent person, to properly defend himself.8
The problem confronting the court in its attempt to define a precise
line where a right to counsel began was complicated by parallel
developments in the right to a jury trial. In Duncan v. Louisiana," the
Court held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applied to the
states via the fourteenth amendment. There, the defendant was denied
a jury trial on a misdemeanor charge and was later convicted. The
charge, simple battery, carried a maximum sentence of two years in jail
majority's rule would require state and local governments to appropriate considerable funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States with
21% of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all state appropriations

for indigent defense." Id. at 61 n.30 (Powell, J., concurring). See generally H.
JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS

(1968).

See notes 1, 3 supra and accompanying text.
85 Justice Douglas disputed Justice Powell's doubt about the availability of
legal resources.
It has been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 full-time counsel
would be required to represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding
traffic offenders. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to
Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These figures are
relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated 355,200 attorneys in the United States (Statistical Abstract of the United States 153
(1971)), a number which is projected to double by the year 1985. See
Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A.J. 146, 147.
Indeed, there are 18,000 new admissions to the bar each year-3,500
more lawyers than are required to fill the "estimated 14,500 average annual openings." Id. at 148.
407 U.S. at 37 n.7.
Id. at 40.
s FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.01(1) (West, 1969).
6
407 U.S. at 26.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
88
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and a $300 fine," but the defendant was only sentenced to sixty days in
jail plus a $150 fine. Louisiana argued that even if the sixth amendment
required the right to trial by jury in "serious" criminal cases, the relevant yardstick was not the maximum sentence authorized for an offense, but the sentence actually imposed. 1 The Court specifically rejected that contention, stating:
[T]he penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major
relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in
itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the
Sixth Amendment. ... The penalty authorized by the law of the
locality may be taken "as a gauge of its social and ethical judgment . . . of the crime in question. 92
This language, purporting to establish the punishment authorized
instead of the punishment actually imposed as the relevant yardstick in
determining the sixth amendment's line of demarcation, is important to
consider in comparing the parallel sixth amendment analysis in Argersinger.3
In Baldwin v. New York,94 the Court further refined this test by defining "serious" and "petty" for purposes of determining the applicability
of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. The Court held that "no
offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
95
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."
Interestingly enough, the Court in Argersinger changed course and
applied a yardstick based on punishment "imposed," i.e., actual incarceration, rather than the Duncan/Baldwin yardstick of punishment
"authorized," in setting the standard for right to counsel." The resulting
"double" standard under the sixth amendment for the twin rights to
jury trial and counsel can be explained, in part, by the different history
of each right." Part of the difference can also be explained by the desire
of the Court in both Duncan and Argersinger to limit their holdings to
the specific facts. The Court acknowledged that its decision in Argersinger would not affect the "run of misdemeanors."98 As a result the
standard set forth was that, "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
91

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West, 1942).

391 U.S. at 149.
at 159-60 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

92 Id.

91See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
9' Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
407 U.S. at 40.
For a review of the parallel histories of right to counsel and right to jury
trial see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 44-46 (Powell, J., concurring). See
also id. at 29-31 (opinion of Justice Douglas).
Id. at 40.
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no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he is represented by counsel at
his trial." 99
Several problems have emerged from this standard."' First, Argersinger's own rationale is inconsistent with the double standard that
emerged from the decision. In justifying a standard giving a right to
counsel in situations where there was no right to a jury-that is,
where a defendant is charged with a crime punishable by less than six
months-the court observed that "while there is historical support for
limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal
cases,' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to
assistance of counsel.""'' Despite the Court's implication that the right
to counsel is more fundamental to a fair proceeding then the right to
trial by jury,' the Court's standard actually results in a right to
counsel standard that is "more restrictive than the standard for granting a right to jury trial."'0 3
Id. at 37.
See generally KRANTZ, supra note 3, at 69-117. Mr. Justice Powell recognized an equal protection problem:
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to favor defendants
classified as indigents over those not so classified, yet who are in lowincome groups were engaging counsel in a minor petty-offense case
would be a luxury the family could not afford. The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel is necessarily somewhat
arbitrary, drawn differently from State to State and often resulting in
serious inequities to accused persons. The Court's new rule will accent
the disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically....
...The new rule announced today also could result in equal protection problems: There may well be an unfair and unequal treatment of
individual defendants, depending on whether the individual judge has
determined in advance to leave open the option of imprisonment. Thus,
an accused indigent would be entitled in some courts to counsel while in
other courts in the same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same
offense would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel may be
essential to a fair trial even in cases in which no jail sentence is imposed,
the results of this type of pretrial judgment could be artibrary and
discriminatory.
407 U.S. at 50-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
101Id. at 30.
102Justice Brennan, dissenting in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979),
characterized the majority view in Argersinger as holding that "the right to
counsel was more fundamentally related to the fairness of criminal prosecutions
than the right to jury trial and was in fact essential to the meaningful exercise of
other Sixth Amendment protections." Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, concurring in Argersinger,restated the majority's view. "[Tihe
interest protected by the right to have guilt or innocence determined by a
jury-tempering the possibly arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and
judicial power-while important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a fair
trial as is the right to counsel." 407 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., concurring).
" Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 380 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

1980]

REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

523

Second, the Argersinger standard has inherent problems in application. '°4 In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Burger noted that under
the standard set forth:
[Tihe trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in a
predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether there
is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted, the
trial judge will sentence him to a jail term. .

.

. As to jury

cases, the [prosecuting attorney] should be prepared to inform
the judge as to any prior record of the accused, the general
nature of the case against the accused, including any use of
violence, the severity of harm to the victim, the impact on the
community, and the other factors relevant to the sentencing
process." 5
It is probably bad practice for a prosecutor to inform a judge before
trial of aggravating matters prejudicial to the defendant" 6 because
such pre-trial disclosure may jeopardize the judge's appearance of
impartiality. If done in an ex parte manner, the procedure may also
violate the American Bar Association Standards relating to the funcKRANTZ, supra note 3, at 69-117. The authors raise several questions
concerning the implementations of Argersinger. For example, what is a prosecutor's standing to object to a failure to appoint counsel, which failure would
preclude a jail sentence for the defendant? Is there a usurpation of power if a
court refuses to appoint counsel in a case where a minimum jail sentence is mandated by the legislature? This book also examines the many Argersinger complications resulting from retrial and mistrial situations. After analyzing the possible alternative in implementing Argersinger, the authors conclude that the
"imprisonment-in-law standards" should be the Argersinger standard. Under this
standard, first envisioned in Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685 (1968), counsel would be appointed for any indigent
104 See

defendant charged with an offense for which a jail sentence is authorized. This is
the standard which the Supreme Court specifically rejected in Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
105 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
106 Courts have traditionally taken the view that judges are presumed to be
intellectually disciplined enough to make decisions and findings of fact without
considering inadmissible evidence which the judge has heard in the pre-trial process. See, e.g., Webster v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Krantz et at; however, have argued that "by far the better practice is to restrict
even judges from learning the type of information that would be in a presentence
report or would be the basis for an individualized prediction." KRANTZ, supra

note 3, at 88. The authors have also noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that "The (presentence) report shall not be submitted to the court
or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or has
been found guilty." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (c)(1). In addition, the Court in Gregg v.
United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969) held that "(t)o permit the ex parte introduction
of this sort of material . . . would seriously contravene the rule's purpose of
preventing possible prejudice from premature submission of the presentence
report." Id. at 492.
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tion of the trial judge. ' Although it is not unusual for a trial judge to
hear inadmissible evidence as a prelude to making rulings thereon,
there would appear to be little justification for deliberately providing a
trial judge with prejudicial information concerning a defendant before
trial if it is already conceded by a prosecutor that such information
would be inadmissible on the issue of guilt or innocence. 8
Although Chief Justice Burger seems to acknowledge that "[in a
nonjury case the prior record of the accused should not be made
known to the trier of fact except by way of traditional impeachment,"' 9
this does not take into account the trial judge's role in a jury trial of
judging the facts in ruling on motions such as a motion for acquittal.
Furthermore, since many criminal trials are to the court, the proviso all
but eliminates the means in most cases for making the predictive determination the Chief Justice views as necessary under the Argersinger
rule.'
Argersinger also presents special problems in the area of student
representation. Since there is no absolute standard for determining the
right to counsel where no judicial predictive analysis is performed
before trial and sentencing, a student cannot be sure whether his
representation will satisfy sixth amendment requirements, or is merely
being given gratuitously to a client who has no constitutional right to
counsel. The distinction between the former and the latter can be
significant. In the former case, a trial judge may open the door to incarceration of a defendant by appointing student counsel who otherwise
would not be assigned any counsel because of the minor nature of the
offense. In the latter case the jailhouse door would remain shut. It
would indeed be ironic if Argersinger resulted in students providing a
court with a cheap and convenient means for making a defendant eligible for a jail term. On the other hand, if a student's representaton is
viewed as not being representation comtemplated by the sixth amendment, students would be free to represent indigent defendants without
the fear of opening the jailhouse doors to their clients.'
107"The trial judge should insist that neither the prosecutor nor the defense
counsel nor any other person discussed a pending case with him ex parte, except
after adequate notice to all other parties and when authorized by law or in
accordance with approved practice." ABA STANDARDS CRIM. JUST., Functions of
the Trial Judge § 1.6 (1974). Since it may be presumed that no defense counsel
would consent to ex parte disclosure by a prosecutor to a judge of matters potentially damaging to the defendant, some sort of hearing would be required. Such a
hearing, or course, raises new questions of procedure and evidence, such as the
burden of proof. There is also the persistent question of equal protection, since
only indigents requesting counsel would be required to submit to such a hearing
and suffer the consequences of potentially damaging disclosures prior to trial.
See generally KRANTZ, supra note 3.
100 See note 106 supra.
407 U.S. at 42 n.* (emphasis added).
110See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 128-32 infra and accompanying text.
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Post-Argersinger

If there were any doubts that the right to counsel under the Argersinger test applied only to offenses for which a jail sentence was
ultimately imposed, those doubts were put to rest in Scott v. Illinois."'
In Scott, the defendant was charged with shoplifting, which carried a
maximum authorized punishment of $500 fine or one year in jail, or
both. The Supreme Court adopted "actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.... Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented, unable to reconcile the
1,2

440 U.S. 367 (1979).

Id. at 373. It is interesting to note that in seeking a constitutional "line" the
Court gives little attention to the collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction. In Argersinger, for example, Justice Powell noted several important
areas of civil disabilities resulting from misdemeanor convictions, even where no
jail sentence is imposed:
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable by
imprisonment. Stigma may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a
hit-and-run escapade. Losing one's driver's license is more serious for
some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971), we said:
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licenses. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 539. When the deprivation of property rights
and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a
denial of due process.
407 U.S. at 42 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell also recognized other collateral consequences such as
"forfeiture of public office, State v. Kruger, 280 Mo. 293, 217 S.W. 310 (1919); disqualification for a licensed profession, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3094 (1962)
(optometrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-4(b) (1965) (real estate brokers); and loss of
pension rights, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.18(3) (1966) (police disability pension denied
when injury is result of participation in fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while
committing crime)." 407 U.S. at 48, n.11 (Powell, J., concurring).
113

See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS (1967), reprintedin 23 VAND. L. REV.
929 (1970):
As a general matter civil disability law has simply not been rationally
designed to accommodate the varied interest of society and the individual convicted person. There has been little effort to evaluate the
whole system of disabilities and disqualifications that has grown up....
As a result, convicted persons are generally subjected to numerous
disabilities and disqualifications which have little relation to the crime
committed, the person committing it or, consequently, the protection of
society. They are often harsh out of all proportion to the crime committed.
Id. at 88, 23 VAND. L. REV. at 929.
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majority's opinion with the jury trial standard under the sixth amendment:
The Court's reasoning in applying the right to counsel in the
case before it-that the right to counsel is more fundamental
to a fair proceeding than the right to jury trial and that the
historical limitations on the jury trial right are irrelevant to
the right to counsel-certainly cannot support a standard for
the right to counsel that is more restrictive than the standard
for granting a right to jury trial. As my Brother Powell commented in his concurring opinion in Argersinger.
.. It is
clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it
must be drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed
counsel in all cases in which there is a due process right to a
jury trial." Argersinger then established a "two dimensional"
test for the right to counsel: the right attaches to any "nonpetty" offense punishable by more than six months in jail and
in addition to any offense where actual incarceration is likely
regardless of the maximum authorized penalty." 4
Scott has significance for clinical programs since it removed from
the purview of the sixth amendment all cases carrying an authorized
punishment of incarceration, but for which a jail term is not expected
to be imposed. Therefore, students representing clients charged with
such offenses need not meet the sixth amendment standards for
counsel. However, the uncertainty with regard to the effect of student
representation on the client's potential for a jail term remains since little has been done to resolve the Argersinger-Scott problems of "individualized prediction." 5
In Baldasar v. Illinois,"6 the Court was again plagued by complications resulting from attempts to apply the Argersinger standard.
Baldasar was convicted in May, 1975, of theft, under a statute which
authorized a maximum punishment of imprisonment of one year and a
fine of $1,000. Baldasar was not represented by a lawyer and did not
waive his right to an attorney. Within the bounds of Argersinger,
Baldasar was fined $159 and placed on probation for one year. In
August, 1976, Baldasar was convicted a second time for theft. Under
Illinois law, a second theft conviction may be treated as a felony with a
prison term of one to three years." 7 At the.second trial, the record of
the first conviction was admitted into evidence over the objection of
Baldasar, who was subsequently convicted and sentenced to one to
three years in prison. "'S

"6

440 U.S. at 380 (citation omitted).
See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
446 U.S. 222 (1980).

"

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b)(5) (1975).

"
"5

446 U.S. at 223.
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Baldasar's argument on appeal was a simple one: Since Argersinger
had held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel at
his trial,".. 9 he could not be sentenced to jail on the basis of a prior
case in which he was convicted without the benefit of counsel 2 0° At
first blush Baldasar's contention appeared to be consistent with both
Argersinger and Scott, but four dissenting members of the Court
rejected this simplistic approach. They argued that "this line of argument misapprehends the nature of the enhancement statutes,'' for
such laws do not affect a prior sentence, but merely subject a person
to increased punishment if that person decides to commit the second
crime. Thus, as long as the first conviction was valid (which it was
because no prison term was imposed and thus no counsel required) it
should be permitted to be introduced into evidence in the same manner as any other constitutionally valid conviction. The dissent's rule
simply states, then, that the conviction was either valid or it was not;
but if it was valid, it could be used to enhance the sentence of a later
conviction.
The other five Justices, speaking through three separate opinions,
disagreed, holding that a conviction may be constitutionally valid for
some purposes, but not for others.' Justice Stewart looked at the
ultimate result, holding that it is "clear . . . that this prison sentence
' 3
He argued that
violated the constitutional rule of Scott v. Illinois."'

407 U.S. at 37.
446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
"'

Id. at 232 (Burger, C.J., Powell, J., White, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

122Id. at 224-30.
123 Id. at 224. Cf. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (conviction upheld
even though an earlier underlying conviction was subject to attack on sixth
amendment grounds). In Lewis, the defendant was convicted of a felony in 1961,
without benefit of counsel. Subsequently, he was charged and convicted under 18
U.S.C. APP. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) which prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court upheld the firearm violation despite the fact
that the underlying state felony conviction was subject to collateral attack on
sixth amendment grounds. The Court reasoned:
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil
firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal sanction is not inconsistent
with Tucker [404 U.S. 443 (1973)], Loper [405 U.S. 473 (1978)], and
Burgett [389 U.S. 190 (1967)]. In each of those cases this Court found that
the subsequent conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment
because it depended upon the reliability of a past uncounseled conviction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on reliability, but on the
mere fact of conviction ....
445 U.S. at 67.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, observed that the "[p]etitioner has already been
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution. In the absence of any clear congressional expression of its intent, I cannot accept a construction of § 1202(a)(1) that
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had it not been for the prior conviction, the petitioner could not have
been sentenced to more than one year for the present offense. Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion stated: "[A] conviction which is invalid
for the purpose of imposing a sentence of imprisonment for the offense
itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment for a subsequent conviction under a repeater-offender statute.' ' 24
Justice Powell, dissenting, complained that this holding creates a
"hybrid" conviction which may be "valid for the purposes of their own
penalties as long as the defendant receives no prison term,"'2 5 but
"invalid for the purpose of enhancing punishment upon a subsequent
misdemeanor conviction."'20 Justice Marshall's opinion rejected this
notion that it had created a "hybrid," arguing that "a conviction
invalid for imposing a prison term directly, but valid for imposing a
prison term collaterally, would be an illogical and unworkable deviation from our previous cases.' 27 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring
opinion, remained adamant that the standards for right to counsel and
right to a jury trial must be made consistent, and continued to advocate his "bright line" approach, which would give a right to counsel to
any defendant prosecuted for an offense "punishable by more than six
months imprisonment .

.

. or whenever the defendant is convicted of an

offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment.' 28
Although Justice Blackmun's approach would resolve the right to
reflects such an indifference to petitioner's plight ....

Id. at 70. (Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
In any case, the holding in Lewis is difficult to reconcile with that of Baldasar.
Justice Blackmun in a footnote to his concurring opinion in Baldasar,observed:
Today's decision [Baldasar] is all the more puzzling in view of the
Court's recent ruling in Lewis v. United States ... that an uncounseled
felony conviction is a proper predicate for imposing federal sanctions for
possession of a firearm by a felon. Although I dissented on statutory

grounds in Lewis, the opinion's constitutional holding squarely conflicts
with today's decision. Unlike misdemeanors, all uncounseled felony
judgments are constitutionally invalid ....

Yet Lewis held that even

though the federal firearm statute imposes a prison sentence solely
because the defendant had an uncounseled-and thus void-felony conviction to "support guilt or enhance punishment." . . . In this case, the
Court refuses to permit sentence enhancement on the basis of a constitutionally valid misdemeanor conviction. The conflict between the two

holdings could scarcely be more violent.
446 U.S. at 232 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
"2 446 U.S. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
12' Id. at 232 (Powell, J., concurring).
126

Id.
Id. at 228-29 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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counsel conflict with the right to a jury trial under Duncan, neither
Blackmun's nor the plurality's approach resolves the inherent contradictions and problems associated with the implementation of Argersinger/Scott. In fact, under Baldasar the "individualized prediction"
process, which has already been the subject of much scholarly criticism, becomes even more impractical and invites further prejudice to a
criminal defendant.
In Argersinger,Chief Justice Burger stated that "the trial judge and
the prosecutor will have to engage in a predictive evaluation of each
case to determine whether there is a significant likelihood that, if the
defendant is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail
term." 2 ' Under Baldasar a court must make further predictions as to
the likelihood that a person will commit a second offense. The impact
will be to widen the difference in procedure required for indigent, and
non-indigent defendants, further exacerbating the potential due process problems in implementing such widely different procedures.'30
The questions raised by each post-Argersinger decision seem to be
rising exponentially."' For example, must an indigent defendant really
be subject to a "predictive analysis" involving pre-trial disclosure of
prior bad acts, convictions, and other detrimental information, while
the non-indigent remains immune from such prejudice-creating
scrutiny? If so, what kind of hearing is the indigent defendant entitled
to insure accurate disclosure? As the dissent in Baldasar questions,
may uncounseled misdemeanor convictions be used to impeach a defendant's testimony, or may they be considered by a judge in imposing a
sentence?'32
Baldasar also raises important issues concerning the student
defender. Under Baldasar, it is still not clear whether representation
of an indigent defendant by a student defender in a case resulting in
conviction renders that defendant subject to an increased jail sentence
upon conviction of a second offense under a state enhancement statute.
Such answers are important not only to judges and those who administer the criminal justice system, but to the student defenders
themselves who, at a minimum, should be able to advise their indigent
clients of the effect of student representation on the client's potential
exposure to a jail term.
E.

Effective Assistance of Counsel

Standards relating to the right to appointment of counsel under the
sixth amendment have, in large part, evolved separately from the stan-

130
's'
132

407 U.S. at 42.
See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
See note 104 supra.
446 U.S. at 232.
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dards for determining effective assistance of counsel.' 33 The right to
counsel has been defined as a right to effective assistance of counsel,'34
but clear cut standards for determining what is effective counsel have
not been determined. 3

1

Most courts which have considered the ques-

tion have declined to presume prejudice even where some ineffectiveness of counsel has been shown.' 36 Thus, the issue has now become
focused on who has the burden of showing prejudice, and the quantum
37
of prejudice required for reversal.

The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is imporant to the stuIn 1974 one critic evisioned a new sixth amendment frontier:
Just as the cutting edge of the law of criminal procedure has been the
extension and exposition of the right to counsel, the substance of that
right will provide tomorrow's forward thrust. Increasingly, in sixth
amendment litigation, the courts will have to define the right to effective counsel, not the sweep of the right to counsel.
Lee, Right to Effective Counsek A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277,
277-278 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Another commentator has noted that the history of the evolution of effective
assistance standards are "of comparatively recent vintage." Note, Incompetency
of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299, 299 (1973). The use of the term "effective" in
describing counsel can be traced to Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See note 57 supra. There are numerous comprehensive histories of the evolution of standards for effective counsel. See
generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077
(1973); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and Remedies, 41
Mo. L. REV. 483 (1976); Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:
New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443 (1977); Schwarzer, Dealing with
Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1980);
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A ConstitutionalRight in Transition, 10
VAL. L. REV. 509 (1976); Comment, Assuring the Right to An Adequately
PreparedDefense, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 302 (1974); Comment, Current
Standards for Determining Ineffective Assistance: Still a Sham, Farce or
Mockery, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 132; Comment, Defects in Ineffective Assistance
133

Standards Used by State Courts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1979).
'

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); United States v. Woods, 487 F.2d

1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1973).
131KRANTZ, supra note 4, at 170.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Twomey,

510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 876 (1975); United States v.DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); but see,
e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (prejudice presumed where
attorney had conflict of interest).
137 United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (once defendant
shows ineffective assistance, the burden of showing lack of prejudice shifts to the
state); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968)
(burden on state to establish lack of prejudice resulting from ineffective
representation). Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (court must declare
a belief that a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Moore
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (late appointment of counsel raises
presumption of prejudice).
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dent practitioner since the student has an interest in insuring that his
representation not only meets the sixth amendment requirements of
proper appointment of counsel, but also meets the additional sixth and
fourteenth amendment requirements of effective assistance. If a student defender's compliance with the latter can be attached solely on
the basis of the student's status as an unlicensed practitioner, his position will always be tenuous.
At present there are probably as many standards for determining
effective assistance of counsel as there are courts grappling with the
issue. The old "sham" and "mockery of justice" standard appears to be
yielding to the pressure of scholarly and judicial criticism.139 Under
that standard, relief from conviction based on incompetence of counsel
could be granted only when the trial was a farce, a mockery of justice,
was shocking to the conscience, or when the lawyer's representation
was in bad faith, a sham, or a pretense. 4 ' Based on the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, rather than the more
stringent requirements of the sixth amendment, this standard probably
deserves the criticism of Judge Bazelon that it "requires such a
minimum level of performance from counsel that [it] is itself a mockery
of the sixth amendment."' 1 Certainly a student practitioner could have
U.S.
See, e.g., Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __
100 S. Ct. 1342 (1980); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978);

__,

United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Twomey,
510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970);
Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1957); People v. Pope, 23 Cal.3d 412, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859
(1979); Lower v. People, 100 Cal. App. 3d 144, 161 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1980); People v.
Bliss, 44 Ill. 2d 363, 255 N.E.2d 405 (1970); People v. Nelson, 42 Ill. 2d 172, 246
N.E.2d 244 (1969); People v. Gonzales, 40 Ill. 2d 233, 239 N.E.2d 783 (1968); People
v. Haywood, 79 I1. App. 3d 303, 398 N.E.2d 179 (1976); Joos v. Auto-Owners Ins.
*Co., 94 Mich App. 419, 288 N.W.2d 443 (1980); People v. O'Guin, 26 Mich. App.
419, 288 N.W.2d 443 (1970); Trimble v. State, 593 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1980); Burroughs v. State, 590 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. App. 1979); Sturrock v. State, 95 Nev. 938,
604 P.2d 341 (1979). See generally Finer, supra note 133; Stone, Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases: Charging
Standards and Practical Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 427
(1975); Comment, Defects in Effective Assistance Standards Used by State
Courts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1979).
" See generally note 133 supra and accompanying text; Comment, Criminal

Law- ConstitutionalRequirement of Effective Counselfor a Criminal Defendant
if Judged by the Standard of "ReasonablyEffective Assistance" and not "FarceMockery," 6 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1115 (1975).
See, e.g., United States v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 909 (1971); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945).
141 Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 28
(1973). Judge Bazelon refers to his own court which has adopted what appears to
be a more stringent standard:
A defendant is required to show that counsel's "gross incompetence
140
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little satisfaction in knowing that his performance met constitutional
requirements because it was a little better than a "farce." Although
many courts retain the "sham and farce" standards 4 1 or a variation of
it, the trend is clearly towards more stringent requirements for effective assistance of counsel. For example, some courts, while retaining
the semantics of the "sham" test, have nevertheless required a showing that there was no "denial of fundamental fairness;" ' other variations include "flagrant shortcomings"'4 4 or "so lacking in competence
that it becomes the duty of the court or the prosecution to observe it
and correct it.""' 5 Still other variations include "travesty" or "gross
incompetence"'4 6 as the applicable standards.
A modern trend towards a standard of "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney" appears to be highlighted by the case of United
States v. Decoster."7 Variations of this test include "reasonable skill
and diligence," 48 and "genuine and effective representation."'49 The
United States Supreme Court in McMann v. Richardson,5 ' while referring to a standard "range of competence demanded of attorneys"'' did
not attempt to define the term, but rather relegated that matter to the
"good sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that
if the right to counsel ... is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be
left to the services of incompetent counsel."'5 2 The Court's reference to
blotted out the essence of a substantial defense". This test permits the
court to concentrate on a single defense rather than the entire trial. But,
like "mockery of justice," "gross incompetence" is too vague a concept to
provide courts and lawyers with any notice of what "effective
assistance" requires. The vagueness and cryptic application of our standard rob it of any prophylactic effect.
Id. at 29.
"' See, e.g., McMillan v. New Jersey, 408 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Wilkins, 351 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916, rehearing
denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1965); Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 883 (1965); Davis v. State, 253 Ark. 484, 486 S.W.2d 904 (1972).
143 E.g., People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 423, 514 P.2d 69, 73 (1973).
114 E.g., People v. Rice, 37 Colo. App. 346, 348, 551 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1976).
"' E.g., Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1966).
146 E.g., Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
141 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14' E.g., People v. Geiger, 10 Mich. App. 339, 159 N.W.2d 383 (1968).
149 Isijola v. State, 340 A.2d 844 (Del. 1975).

1" 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
...
Id. at 771.
1"2Id. The lack of any definition of ineffectiveness from the Supreme Court
has been noted by Judge Bazelon. "The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the issue of ineffectiveness. This may be because the Court is still
developing the law on the threshold question-when and where the right to
counsel exists .... Hopefully the Court will not delay much longer in addressing
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"gross errors" and "serious dereliction" has been adopted by some
at least in part, the
lower courts.' Other courts have incorporated,'
proposed American Bar Association standards for defense counsel
which include specific steps an attorney must take to insure effective
assistance.155

The traditional view has been that actual prejudice must be shown
before a conviction can be voided on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel. 5 ' Although this requirement has been relaxed in certain
situations," 7 the "harmless error" doctrine" 8 has been consistently
applied. One formulation has required the defendant to show lack of
effective assistance of counsel, but shifted the burden of showing lack
of prejudice to the prosecution.151 Other courts have placed the burden
of showing prejudice on the defendant. 6'
The issue of the constitutional requirements of effective assistance
of counsel may arise in a variety of situations in the context of student
representation. At least one lower court has asked whether a student
supervisor who merely sits in the back of a courtroom and observes
the question of what effectiveness means." Bazelon, supra note 141, at 21-22. See
also KRANTZ, supra note 4: "The Supreme Court should define the minimum standards required to comply with the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel." Id. at 175.
1

See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

435 U.S. 1011 (1978); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 593, 271 A.2d 481, 483
(1970).
" See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849

(1968); State v. Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
115 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIM.
JUST., STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function (1974). "As

soon as practicable, the lawyer should seek to determine all relevant facts known
to the accused .... Id. § 3.2(a); "The lawyer should inform the accused of his
rights forthwith and take all necessary action to vindicate such rights .. " Id. §
3.6; "It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case ..."Id. § 4.1; "[T]he lawyer should advise the accused ...
concerning all aspects of the case...." Id. § 5.1(a); "[T]he lawyer for the accused
should explore the possibility of an early diversion of the case from the criminal
process. ... ."Id. § 6.1(a); "After conviction, the lawyer should explain to the

defendant the meaning and consequences of the court's judgment and the defendant's right of appeal." Id. § 8.2(a).
156 See, e.g., United States v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 876 (1975); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); but see Beasley v.

United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (harmless error tests do not apply
in regard to the deprivation of a procedural right so fundamental as the effective
assistance of counsel).
"s

See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978).
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the performance of a student in trial meets the constitutional requirements of "'zealous and active counsel' and [for] representation in a
'substantial sense' not merely 'pro forma'."''
Raising this question crystallizes the problem. If sixth amendment
compliance of student representation is to rest upon the law license of
the supervisor, and if the supervisor takes only a passive role while
letting the student conduct the trial, does this arrangement meet the
overall requirement of effective assistance? At least one state court,
although subsequently overruled, has answered this question affirmatively.'
Determining the student's status becomes even more important
when determining whether student representation in and of itself
meets the requirements of the sixth amendment. If student representation does meet those requirements, must the legality and propriety of
such representation depend on 1) the credentials of the supervisor, 2) a
defendant's waiver of sixth amendment rights, or 3) the fact that a
client possesses no sixth amendment rights in the case in question?
IV.

STUDENT PRACTICE AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

A.

Generally

The question of whether student practice complies with sixth amendment requirements has been raised in very few cases." 3 In even fewer
cases has that specific question been resolved.
In State v. Daniels,"4 the defendant was represented by two law
students who were supervised by a licensed attorney. The defendant
consented in writing to this representation. Shortly before the trial, a
new supervisor was substituted for the original supervisor, but no new
consent form was signed by either the defendant or the new supervisor. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there was a violation of
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XX, which required written consent by
both a client and a supervisor as a prerequisite to student representation. 5 The defendant also claimed that the student representation
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 66 The Court found that
defendant's oral consent on the record was sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule XX, but refused to consider the claim that student

161

People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34, 42 (1978), rev'd, 24

Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176 (1979).
162 Id.
613

'
"6
166

See notes 175-93 infra and accompanying text.

346 So.2d 672 (La. 1977).
Id. at 674. See LA. Su'p. Ca. R. xx.
346 So.2d at 676.
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since the issue of ineffective
representation was ineffective assistance
16 7
trial.
at
raised
not
was
assistance
In People v. Masonis'" the defendant, represented by student
counsel, was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to
thirty days in jail or a one hundred dollar fine. The trial court failed to
advise the defendant that he was represented by student counsel. The
appellate court held that the student's introduction of himself as a student at the trial was sufficient to comply with the local student practice rule and that defendant's representation was not in violation of
effective assistance of counsel standards."9
In State v. Cook,"70 the defendant was prosecuted by a student legal
intern. The defendant argued that such prosecution by a student was
illegal under a statute that required deputy prosecutors to be "admitted as an attorney . . . of the courts of this state. 1. 1 Under a state
statute which authorized the prosecuting attorney to "employ . . .
other necessary employees,' 72 the court found that the representation
was adequate since the student had otherwise complied with the local
student practice rule. The court also noted that there was no showing
of prejudice to the defendant.'73 A New York court rejected this approach and denied, without explanation, permission for third year law
students from a university legal aid clinic to represent persons "accused
of a crime. '' ..
In People v. Perez, 75 the question of the sixth amendment qualifications of a student attorney was directly addressed. The California Court
of Appeals for the Fourth District found that the mere presence of a
supervising attorney at a felony jury trial in which the defendant's
defense was conducted by a student "did not amount to representaId.
58 Mich. App. 615, 228 N.W.2d 489 (1975). The Supreme Court of California
in People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, cites this case
for the proposition that the state "held that the participation of a supervised law
student did not violate the defendant's right to assistance of counsel." Id. at 139,
594 P.2d at 4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
58 Mich. App. at 618, 288 N.W.2d at 491.
84 Wash. 2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974).
71 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.27.010 (1974).
172 Id. § 36.61.070.
17' 84 Wash. 2d at 349, 525 P.2d at 767.
174 In re Application of Cornell Legal Aid Clinic, 26 A.D.2d 790, 790, 273 N.Y.S.
2d 444, 446 (1966) ("Application insofar as it requests approval of representation
by law students of indigent persons at hearings in post-conviction proceedings
and on appeals in criminal actions and habeas corpus proceedings, and of indigent
mental patients at commitment and sanity hearings denied.").
175 147 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1978), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1979).
167
16'
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of representation

counsel."'76 The background facts and extent of supervision
characterized by the appellate court as follows:

by

were

On the first day of trial, Perez appeared with Edward Zinter, his
appointed counsel (deputy public defender) and Jack Loo, a certified law student. Mr. Zinter identifed himself and told the
court he was appearing on behalf of defendant. At that time a
form was filed, signed by Perez consenting to representation by
Mr. Loo. Mr. Loo was identified therein as a law student under
the supervision of Mr. Zinter. The conduct of Perez's defense
was carried on wholly by Mr. Loo. He examined and crossexamined witnesses, made objection and motions, made argument to the jury. Mr. Zinter, however, was present throughout
the entire three-day trial. He uttered a total of 36 words. The
record does not reflect the nature or the extent of any private
conversations between Mr. Loo and Mr. Zinter in the course of
the trial. From this record, we conclude Mr. Zinter's interest in
the trial was not of a "continuing and substantial nature."..
Cal. Rptr. at 43. The California Court of Appeals did take note of
Justice Brennan's Argersinger opinion that "law students can be expected to
make a significant contribution, quantitavely and qualitatively, to the representa176147

tion of poor in many areas including cases reached by today's decision." 407 U.S.

at 41 (emphasis added by the California Court of Appeals, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 39).
The Court used this quote to support its contention that there is nothing in
Argersinger, which was a misdemeanor case, sanctioning student representation
of a defendant charged with a felony. The court of appeals cautioned against the
"dangers inherent in the practice of law by a student." Id., 147 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
[Any law student ... is apt to overlook relevant facts, to base his opinion of the law on a century-old case in a minority jurisdiction, to be
unaware of statutory or administrative regulation which has supplanted
the common law, and to fail to recognize the available defenses. Because
the law is, in fact, a "seamless web", it is impossible to give competent
advice in one area without a partial understanding of all the law.
Id. quoting Johnson, Unauthorized Practice by Law Students: Some Legal
Advice About Legal Advice, 36 TEX. L. REV. 346, 348 (1958).

The court further observed:
An experienced trial judge can only watch with horror as a neophyte
destroys his own case by inept questioning. The immediate presence of
the experienced lawyer cannot undo the harm done by a single disastrous question. He cannot unring the bell; he cannot rehabilitate the
effect of clumsy or disasterous handling of a difficult witness. There may
be but one moment of time in the course of a trial when the right act,
word or decision can be made and the case won. A reasonable doubt may
be created. If that moment of opportunity passes, no amount of postverdict advice to or critique of the law student's performance will give
solace to a defendant in prison.
147 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
77 Id. at 36-37.

REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

1980]

537

Although the defendant had not contended that his representation was
incompetent, the court found the defendant's representation to be deficient under sixth amendment standards rendering defendant's conviction reversible per se despite what would otherwise be considered
"overwhelming evidence of guilt of the defendant." '78
The reversal of the trial court's conviction was based upon the following points: 1) the defendant was not represented by "licensed" counsel
since the supervisor's passive role at the trial was merely "pro
forma"; 9 2) the student was engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law since the rule under which the student was practicing had never
been approved by the State Supreme Court; 0 3) the defendant's written
waiver of counsel and consent to student representation was invalid
because it was not knowingly and understandably made;' 8' and 4) an
unlicensed student does not meet the sixth amendment requirement of
assistance of "adequate" counsel because the student's "moral standards .

.

. are largely unknown,"' 82 and because the student lacks train-

ing and experience.
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the conviction holding that the defendant was properly represented by a student under the supervision of a licensed attorney as
authorized by State Bar rules. 8 ' The court found the question of
Id. at 43.
Id.
s Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
19

at
at
at
at

37.
38-39.
41.
42-43. The court also observed:

[I]n evaluating whether representation by a law student with a
licensed attorney in silent presence is the functional equivalent of
assistance of counsel, another factor should be considered. The admission to practice law in California depends upon moral fitness as well as
demonstrated knowledge of the law. The State Bar not only scrutinizes
the moral reputation of applicants, but also requires that they take and
pass a Professional Responsibility Examination in which they must
demonstrate an understanding of and ability to apply the ethical standards of the profession.... By contrast the certified law student's moral
standards and working knowledge of professional ethics are largely
unknown.
Id.
24 Cal.3d 133, 139-42, 594 P.2d 1, 4-7, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, 180-82 (1979).
The State Bar Rules here rest on the premise that although only a
member of the bar is competent to undertake to represent a defendant
without supervision, an advanced law student is competent to do so if he
received immediate supervision from experienced counsel. If such Rules
in fact serve to provide defendants with competent defense, we find no
abridgment of constitutional protections.... A doctrinaire adherence to
the fiction that admission to the bar, and that alone, confers competence
to appear on behalf of a criminal defendant would seriously impede pro-

IN
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whether the student was engaged in the unauthorized practice of la
to be irrelevant, since, unlike cases in which a defendant is represented by an impostor, the student's conduct gave rise to no moral
irresponsiblity and caused no actual prejudice to the defendant.' 4
Additionally, waiver of counsel necessary to meet sixth amendment
requirements was not required since the student's representation
under supervision of a licensed attorney constituted representation of
the type contemplated by the sixth amendment. In any event, the written waiver signed by defendant did meet the waiver requirements of
the California student practice rule.' Finally, the court held that the
student's representation must be judged by the same standards applicable to representation in cases not involving students and since there
was no allegation that the student's representation was incompetent,
the student's representation met the sixth amendment standards for
effective assistance. 88
Justice Moore, in a vigorous dissent, argued that the majority had
inaccurately phrased the question and that, in fact, the issue was
whether the sixth amendment was impaired "when attorneys are
assisted by law students," not "when it is the law student who is
assisted by the attorney."'87 Justice Moore shared the court of appeals'
gress toward the objective of providing defendants with counsel who are
able in fact to provide a reasonably competent defense. The realities of
the matter thus compel the conclusion that a defendant such as the one
before us today who has received reasonably competent representation
pursuant to a program replete with safeguards designed to ensure the
competency of representation has not been denied his constitutional
right to assistance of counsel merely because one of the two persons who
appeared on his behalf was not yet a member of the bar.
Id., 594 P.2d at 4-7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 180-82.
18
Id. at 142-43, 594 P.2d at 7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
'" The State Bar Rules themselves should, of course, be read to require that
any consent be knowingly and intelligently executed. But since constitutional rights are not at stake, the presumption that "official duty has
been regularly performed" [CAL. EVID. CODE § 664] should be sufficient
to place on defendant the burden of showing the invalidity of the consent. Defendant has not attempted to carry that burden; in fact, he has
never expressly claimed that his consent was unknowing or unintelligent, and never described the circumstances under which he executed
the consent.
24 Cal. 3d at 144, 594 P.2d at 8, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
i Id. at 145, 594 P.2d at 9, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 183. "[Any challenge to the effectiveness of the representation afforded defendant by the supervising attorney
and certified law student must be judged by the same standards as those governing cases which do not involve certified students; here defendant makes no claim
that his representation was inadequate by those standards." Id., 594 P.2d at 9,
155 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
"' Id. at 145-46, 594 P.2d at 9, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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concluded, without reservation,
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holding with regard to waiver
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practice of law by a
that "a competent law
a competent counsel."'89
rests on its conclusion

88 Id. at 150-51, 594 P.2d at 12, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
,89
Id. at 147-48, 594 P.2d at 10, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 185. Justice Moore stated,
however, that he was:
[Niot unsympathetic to law school clinical programs. They are a useful
adjunct to the classroom and are likely to produce more able and
resourceful practitioners in the future. But there are pragmatic limits to
the professional services that students should be permitted to under-

take. A felony trial transcends those limits .... However desirable prac-

tical experience may be to the law student, protection of a defendant's
fundamental right to competent counsel prevents approval of a scheme
to move the moot court program into the felony courtroom.
Id. at 152, 594 P.2d at 13, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added).
A student critic has echoed Justice Moore's sentiments that the student attorney in Perez exceeded the pragmatic limits of student representation. This
critic's argument seems to rest on two propositions: 1) that "assistance of
counsel" has been interpreted by all federal courts and most state courts to mean
"representation by a duly licensed attorney, admitted to the bar of the jurisdiction in which he practices," and 2) that representation by counsel is sufficient
only if the participation of counsel is, unlike the student in Perez, of a "controlling" or a "continuing substantial" nature. Note, People v. Perez-Constitutional
Implications of Law Student Representation of Indigent CriminalDefendants, 13
J. MAR. L. REV. 461 (1980).

The cases cited in support of the first proposition, however, are not applicable
to a situation where a student has in fact been authorized to practice within certain limits. For example, in Turnee v. American Bar Ass'n., 407 F. Supp. 451
(N.D. Tex. 1975), a case cited by the critic, the plaintiffs claimed a constitutional
right to have unlicensed lay counsel assist them in court proceedings. The court,
after surveying in detail the history of the term "counsel," merely concluded that
"this court has found no case which has interpreted this statute so as to allow an
unlicensed layman to represent a party other than himself in a civil or criminal
proceeding." Id. at 475. Likewise, in United States v. Afflerback, 547 F.2d 522
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098 (1977), also cited by the critic, the court
merely denied an accused tax evader the right to be represented by an unlicensed lay person. People v. Agnew, 114 Cal.2d 841, 250 P.2d 369 (1952), held that
representation by the layman husband of the defendant, who was not permitted
to give legal advice, did not provide legal assistance to which she was entitled.
None of these cases appears analogous to a case in which a student, pursuant to a
special rule or limited license, represents a client within the limits of the rule or
license.
The cases cited in support of the critic's second proposition are also inapplicable, as they merely stand for the proposition that where both a lawyer and a
lay person appear with a defendant, the lawyer and not the lay person must "control" the representation. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 12 Ill.2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19
(1957); State v. Riggs, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247 (1956). In Perez, however, the
student was not a mere lay person but a law student at least purportedly
authorized to practice law by a bar rule. Both propositions relied upon by the
critic were considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court.
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that competent student representation, under supervision and in compliance with a student practice rule, constitutes compliance with all
sixth amendment standards. A critical link in the court's analysis is its
rejection of the court of appeals' implication that representation by
any person not a member of the bar compels reversal of the judgment.'" One critic of the court of appeals' decision has observed that
"the question is not who was counsel, but what did counsel do?"'91 This
is exactly the question which was asked and answered by the Perez
majority: "[The] defendant in fact received competent representation.
Thus, even if . . . [the student's] conduct might be considered the
unauthorized practice of law-an issue we do not decide today-defendant incurred not the slightest prejudice as a consequence. '
The Perez majority has already been followed in at least one case3 in
a
which a student represented a defendant. In People v. Nelson,"'
'" 24 Cal. 3d at 146, 594 P.2d at 9, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
.9Note, People v. Perez-Misapplicationof the Right to Counsel, 6
DINE L. REV. 545, 565 (1979).
"
'13

PEPPER-

24 Cal. 3d at 142-43, 594 P.2d at 7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
94 Cal. App. 3d 42, 156 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1979).

At a pretrial suppression hearing defendant was represented by a
deputy public defender assisted by a law student certified under the
State Bar Rules Governing The Practical Training Of Law Students.

Before the hearing, defendant executed a document denominated "CONSENT TO REPRESENTATION." Therein he gave his permission that
the certified law student "represent me at my Motion to Suppress" with
the understanding that the student "will be supervised by an attorney
licensed to practice." At commencement of the hearing, in response to
trial court inquiries, defendant acknowledged that he understood he was
being attended by a student who was not a licensed attorney; defendant
stated he "freely and voluntarily" consented to participation of the law
student in the hearing. At the suppression hearing the student examined the witnesses under the direct supervision of a deputy public
defender with whom he consulted from time to time. The student's
cross-examination of the People's sole witness was vigorous and
reflected a high degree of preparation: his examination of defendant's
witnesses successfully brought out factual conflicts helpful to
defendant's case.
Defendant contends participation by the law student in his suppression hearing abridged his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, a
right which, defendant claims, he did not waive.
The public defender was appointed to represent defendant at his
arraignment in superior court. That appointment remained in effect
throughout all further proceedings in the trial court. Although at the
suppression hearing the public defender's exertions in defendant's
behalf were largely conducted through the certified law student, such
participation by a certified law student does not as a matter of law impair defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Defendant was
in fact at all times represented by counsel, the public defender, and thus
a waiver of his right to assistance of counsel was not required as a condi-
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California appellate court held that the participation by a certified student at a defendant's suppression hearing did not impair the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
In most states, the student practitioner will not be faced with the
Perez complication of a student practice rule which has not been
approved by the state's highest judicial body. Under the Perez ration:
ale, a properly promulgated student practice rule would certainly meet
any authorized counsel requirements under the sixth amendment.194
The only remaining inquiry would concern the student's competence at
trial and whether any prejudice to the defendant resulted due to
incompetence. Of course, this is the same inquiry that would be conducted in any case raising the issue of effective assistance of counsel.
The above discussion suggests three types of cases in which student
representation would be proper: 1) cases in which no sixth amendment
right to counsel attaches, 2) cases in which the right to counsel
attaches, but where a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel has
taken place, and 3) cases in which the right to counsel attaches and
where the nature of the student representation is such that it satisfies
the sixth amendment requirements. Each of these types of cases will
be considered separately.
B.

Student Representation Where No Right to Counsel Exists

At first blush, the student practitioner would appear to be on the
safest ground when representing a client who has no right to counsel.
Unfortunately, the matter is not so simple. As already discussed, Scott
and Baldasar have muddied the waters to the point where it is not
always possible for the student to determine ahead of time whether or
95
not a client has a right to counsel.'
For example, consider the following: an indigent defendant is charged
with a second drunken driving offense in a jurisdiction in which the
penalty imposed by judges for such an offense sometimes, but not
always, includes a jail term. The trial judge is not sure whether the
"likelihood" of jail is high enough to merit invading the funds set aside
for compensating appointed counsel. To avoid having to make Justice
Burger's "predictive analysis" of whether a right to counsel exists, 9 ' the
trial judge appoints a willing and able student counsel without cost to
tion of the certified law student's participation in the suppression hearing.
Id. at 48, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (citations omitted).
194 24 Cal. App. 3d at 142-43, 594 P.2d at 6-7, 155 Cal. Rptr. 181-82.
See notes 112-32 supra and accompanying text.
...
'" See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 42 (1972). See also notes 129-32
supra and accompanying text.
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the court or to the defendant.'97 This enables the judge to hedge his
bets, leave the court funds intact, and avoid a situation in which he
makes a "wrong" prediction. Is the student now representing a client
who has no right to counsel? Or is the student now representing a client
with a sixth amendment right to counsel? Presumably the student will
soon fird out. If his client is sent to jail, the student may assume that
his representation has been deemed in compliance with the sixth amendment. If the client is not given a jail term, the student can only assume
that either his representation was deemed gratuitous, in the sense that
it was rendered to a client who had no right to appointed counsel, or
that the judge decided not to give a jail sentence in any event.
In cases in which no jail term is authorized, it does appear that a student practicing in compliance with a properly promulgated student
practice rule would not have any sixth amendment concerns, except in
the matter of effective assistance. Once a student assumes responsibility for representation of a client, the student and his supervisor will be
held to the same standards of effective assistance as any other licensed
attorney, regardless of whether the client has a right to appointed
counsel.'98
C.

Student Representation Pursuant to Waiver of Right to
Sixth Amendment Counsel

A student practitioner may be faced with a situation in which it is not
clear whether a right to appointed counsel attaches. In addition, the
applicable student practice rule may require a written waiver by a
client as a prerequisite to student representation.'99 In such a situation,
" The cost of appointing counsel might not be the only reason a judge may
decline making an appointment in marginal cases. According to Judge Bazelon,
the judicial system provides incentives for waiver of counsel entirely. Judge
Bazelon cites a Massachusetts study showing that "defendants who waive counsel
generally get lower sentences than those who do not." S. BING & S. ROSENFELD,
THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE IN THE LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS OF METROPOLITAN

(1970). Assuming that most law students will be eager and enthusiastic in
their representation, attempting to leave no stone unturned, the system also provides judges with an incentive for avoiding student representation. As Judge
Bazelon observed, "consciously or not, many judges are looking for, as the labor
cases put it, a 'sweetheart' lawyer. They just do not want lawyers to present a
lot of motions or to put a lengthy trial." Bazelon, supra note 141, at 15 (emphasis
added).
198See, e.g., People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 142-43, 594 P.2d 1, 7, 155 Cal. Rptr.
176, 182 (1979) (the student's representation is judged by the same standards as
licensed attorneys).
BOSTON

"'

See, e.g., ABA MODEL STUDENT PRAC. R. II.
(B) An eligible law student may also appear
behalf of the State with the written approval
ney and the supervising Lawyer. (C) In each

B. and II. C:

in any criminal matter on
of the prosecuting attorcase the written consent
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a waiver must be judged by two different standards. Where the client is
clearly entitled to appointed counsel under the sixth amendment, but
there is a question as to whether student representation is of the type
contemplated by the sixth amendment, any waiver of right to counsel
which is used as a basis for student representation must meet the sixth
amendment requirements for waiver. Where student representation is
deemed to satisfy sixth amendment requirements, a waiver must only
meet the requirements of the applicable student practice rule. 00
Although waiver of counsel has long been recognized, 1 the courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
rights... and do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.0 3 In Johnson v. Zerbst,"4 the Supreme Court held that any
waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel must be an "intelligent
waiver," and must "depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, exper2 5
ience, and conduct of the accused.""
The court also cautioned that "it
would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon
the record."' '
and approval referred to above shall be filed in the record of the case
and shall be brought to the attention of the judge of the court or the
presiding officer of the administrative tribunal.
This provision is typical of many state student procedure rules. See note 9 supra.
200 See, e.g., People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d 1, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1979).

Because defendant was at all times represented by both an actively
participating supervising attorney and a certified law student, he did
have representation of counsel. Accordingly, no waiver of his right to
counsel was required by either [the] state or federal Constitution.
We are left only with the question whether the waiver complied with
the Rules.
Id. at 144, 594 P.2d at 8, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
But see Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion in Perez: "The majority opinion is
an enigma on the issue of defendant Perez's consent to representation by the law
student Loo. On the one hand the opinion declares that no waiver of right to
counsel was required, and on the other hand it relies upon the written consent
signed by Perez." 24 Cal.3d at 147, 594 P.2d at 10, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

"0See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) ("An accused, in
the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of
the court, may waive trial by jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel.").
See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962).
23

204

304 U.S. 458 (1938).

25

Id. at 464.
Id. at 465. See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962).
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It has since been held that the record "must show that the accused
was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the
offer."2 7 The record must further establish that the defendant, in waiving his right to counsel "knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.''o 8
Three component parts of a valid waiver have been articulated:
"[Wlaivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, but must
be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."" 9 Thus, the waiver cannot
be the result of threats or promises and cannot be the result of mental
incompetence, insanity, or intoxication.210 The Supreme Court has
elaborated on the "knowing" requirement as follows:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension
of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation
thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the whole matter.
The American Bar Association standards require that "an accused
should not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the
entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough
inquiry into the accused's comprehension of that offer and his capacity
'
to make that choice intelligently and understandably has been made."212
213
In Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court held that a state may
not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a defendant who insists upon
conducting his own defense. The court added that a defendant should
first "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation.""' 4 Should this standard be made applicable to student
representation based on waiver of right to sixth amendment counsel? So
applied, such a waiver must be preceded by a statement to the defendant of the "dangers and disadvantages" of student representation.
2" Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (emphasis added).
210See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Niles, 295 F. Supp. 266 (D.V.I. 1969); Toland v.
Strohl, 147 Colo. 577, 364 P.2d 588 (1961). See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIM. JUST., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, General Principles § 7.2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]:
"No waiver should be found to have been made where it appears that the accused
is unable to make an intelligent and understanding choice because of the mental
condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of other factors."
211 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
212 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 210, General Principles § 7.2.
213 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
214 Id. at 835.
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In Perez, the defendant's written "waiver" was nothing more than a
simple statement that "I ...consent to allow ...[the student] to represent me under . . .direct supervision."2 '5 The Court of Appeals recognized that such a waiver did not meet sixth amendment standards since
the record did not reveal any of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the waiver which would show that the waiver was voluntary,
knowing and intelligent. 1 ' In reversing the Court of Appeals, the
California Supreme Court did not find it necessary to determine
whether the Perez waiver met constitutional standards since it had
already determined that the student representation in the case had complied with sixth amendment requirements." 7
In addition to the guidelines already discussed for waiver of right to
counsel, a waiver resulting in student representation of an indigent
defendant should include an advisement and explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of student representation. For example, the
advisement of advantages might include such factors as low caseload of
the student and the time available to work on the client's case. Disadvantages should include the student's lack of experience and the possible consequences that might flow from such inexperience. The client
should also be advised of the degree to which the moral qualifications of
the student have been examined and the nature and extent of supervision of the student, if any, by a licensed practitioner. The advisement
should further include a statement as to the effect that representation
by a student would have on the client's exposure to a jail sentence. A
signed consent form including these and other standard sixth amendment advisements should satisfy not only most student practice rules,
but also the sixth amendment-provided, however, that the signed
waiver is followed up by a court inquiry on the record to ensure that the
consent form was signed intelligently and knowingly. Student counsel
should take the initiative in insuring that the record reveals such a
waiver.
215People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 144 n.12, 594 P.2d 1, 8 n.12, 155 Cal. Rptr.
176, 183 n.12 (1979). The full waiver form read:
I, Carlos Perez consent to allow Jack R.Loo, a California State Bar
Certified Law Student, to represent me under the direct supervision of
Edward Zinter, my court-appointed counsel, who will assume personal,
professional, responsibility in the matter entitled People of the State of
California v. Carlos Perez, court docket #20630, pending in the Superior
Court of Imperial County, Department III.
This consent extends to all matters in and outside of court, these matters being those set out by the California State Bar as proper for such
Certified Law Students to engage in a representative capacity pertaining to the practice of law.
Consented to and signed this 6th day of September, 1977.
Id.
216 People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 952, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34, 40-41 (1978).
217See note 198 supra and accompanying text.
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A question arises as to whether a proper student representation
waiver can be intelligently given. In cases within the purview of the
sixth amendment, a defendant who is truly made to understand that he
has a right to a more experienced member of the bar might often reject
student counsel. In many cases, a student lawyer's best advice to the
client might be to reject student counsel and insist upon a licensed
attorney. In cases in which it is clear that a court will not authorize the
expenditure of funds for appointed counsel, the student counsel's best
advice to the defendant might be to reject student counsel to insure
immunity from a jail sentence. In any case, it is clear that a requirement
of a full inquiry on the record could drastically reduce the cases
available for student representation. Nevertheless, a waiver including
anything less than the advisements discussed presents a constitutional
problem.
As the Supreme Court has noted, "no system of criminal justice can,
or should survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on
the citizens' abdication through unawareness."1 8
In commenting upon a waiver form of the type now often used as a
basis for student representation, one critic has observed:
First, it is argued that the indigent himself consents to student representation and thus he waives any right he might have
to "more effective" counsel. This is hardly tenable. If an indigent is entitled to have the assistance of "more effective
counsel," his consent to student representation is not a "waiver"
of that right, under the rigorous conception of waiver operable
in this area. The waiver form carefully refrains from indicating
that the indigent has a different choice available, and the harried, troubled defendant cannot be compelled to read between
the lines. Accordingly, I conclude that any argument based on
the defendant's "consent" is a makeweight." 9
Most waiver procedures now being used are considered sufficient
under a state's student practice rule.2" But such waivers, if they do not
include the advisements already discussed, should not be considered as
a satisfactory long-term solution to the sixth amendment problems of
student representation.
V.

PRESENT LEGAL STATUS OF STUDENT REPRESENTATION
OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS

A.

Unauthorized Practice

Most state supreme courts have reserved plenary power over the
admission and discipline of those seeking to practice in the courts of the
218

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).

219

Monaghan, supra note 6, at 462.
See note 190 supra and accompanying text.

20
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state."' Some courts have held that the authority of the supreme court
over the discipline of attorneys is exclusive and absolute222 and does not
depend upon statute.223
Problems with the unauthorized practice by student attorneys have
arisen only where a statute or state bar rule purporting to regulate the
practice of student attorneys has not been formally approved by the
state supreme court. 22 ' For this reason, any student practice program or
clinic should be sure to obtain the judicial approval of its state's highest
judicial body, preferably by a promulgated rule. 25 Where such approval
is obtained, no student practicing within the proscribed limits of that
approval need be concerned with the problem of unauthorized practice.
Nevertheless, problems can still arise in the interpretation of those
proscribed limits. 26 A student representing an indigent client without
proper authority is not only risking sixth amendment problems, but
may also be violating state law. As already discussed, the California
Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals' Perez decision on
other grounds, found it unnecessary to resolve the controversy as to
whether the student's representation constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 7 It did note, however, that the student's representation
28
2
gave rise to "no inference of professional or moral responsibility"
since the student "appeared on behalf of defendant in good faith, relying
upon rules promulgated by the State Bar.."29 The court clearly
distinguished between student representation based on State Bar rules
and cases in which impostors or lay persons engaged in the practice of
law. 23 ' The court distinguished several other cases on the grounds that
"the person who represented the defendant acted without supervision
from qualified counsel; moreover, those decisions rest on the fact that
"' Sullivan v. Alaska Bar Ass'n., 551 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1976); Brotsky v. State
Bar Ass'n., 57 Cal. 2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962); In re Lavine, 2
Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39
(Ky. 1976); In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 358 A.2d 787 (1976); Graham v. Washington
State Bar Ass'n., 86 Wash. 2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976).
See, e.g., Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n., 86 Wash.2d 624, 548 P.2d
310 (1976).
See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
See notes 178-82 supra and accompanying text.
After the Court of Appeals decision in Perez, the California State Bar petitioned for court approval of the State Bar Student Practice Rules. The California
Supreme Court provisionally approved the rules before rendering its decision in
Perez. See People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 142 n.11, 594 P.2d 1, 7 n.11, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 176, 182 n.11 (1979).
See notes 174-90 supra and accompanying text.
See note 182 supra and accompanying text.
People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 143, 594 P.2d 1, 7, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, 182
(1979).
Id., 594 P.2d at 7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
23 Id. at 139, 594 P.2d at 4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
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defendant did not know that his representative was not a member of the
bar." 3
Since the California Supreme Court has provisionally approved of the
student practice rules in California, it would now appear that a student
who complies with the State Bar Student Practice rule has a special
232

status entitling him to practice law within the confines of the rule.

If

the student remains within those confines, he need not be concerned
with unauthorized practice. In addition, in those other states in which
the highest judicial body has approved a form of student practice, it
would also appear that a student practicing within the rule is not engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 33
B.

Student Practice and Bar Discipline

As already noted, the supreme court of a state, usually acting through
the established bar, expresses ultimate authority over the discipline of
attorneys. 34 Unfortunately, court promulgated student practice rules
Id. citing People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957); People v.
Washington, 87 Misc. 2d 103, 384 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1976); Baker v. State, 19 Okla.
Crim. 62, 130 P. 820 (1912).
13 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
2
But see Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S.
3,

143 (1967). In Hackin, the defendant was a layman who appeared in a state habeas
corpus proceeding on behalf of an indigent prisoner. The layman was later convicted of practicing law without a license. The Supreme Court in a per curiam
decision dismissed the defendant's appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Justice Douglas dissented:
Moreover, what the poor need, as much as our corporate grants, is
protection before they get into trouble and confront a crisis. This means
"political leadership" for the "minority poor".... Lawyers will play a
role in that movement; but so will laymen. The line that marks the area
into which the layman may not step except at his peril is not clear. I am
by no means sure the line was properly drawn by the court below where
no lawyer could be found and this layman apparently served without a
fee ....
Certainly the States have a strong interest in preventing legally
untrained shysters who pose as attorneys from milking the public for
pecuniary gain .... But it is arguable whether this policy should support
a prohibition against charitable efforts of nonlawyers to held the poor....
It may well be that until the goal of free legal assistance to the indigent
in all areas of the law is achieved, the poor are not harmed by wellmeaning, charitable assistance of laymen. On the contrary, for the majority of indigents, who are not so fortunate to be served by neighborhood
legal offices, lay assistance may be the only hope for achieving equal
justice at this time.
Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 150-52 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). In
Johnson, the petitioner was disciplined for violating a prison regulation prohibiting inmates from assisting other prisoners in preparing writs. The court held
the regulation invalid. Justice Douglas, concurring, stated: "Laymen-in and out
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are not always explicit in defining the extent of student compliance with
the standards of professional ethics and state disciplinary rules and procedures.
The American Bar Association model rule requires that the supervising attorney "assume professional responsibility for the student's
'
The student himself need only be certified as "being of
guidance."235
23
The rule does not specifically hold the student
good moral character.""
personally responsible for his own professional responsibility. Instead it
places the burden on the supervising attorney.
The majority of student practice rules that speak to professional
responsibility follow the ABA model rule in holding that the supervisor
must "assume personal professional responsibility for the student's
work."'37 Other states, while continuing a similar provision, also require
that a student "certify in writing that he has read and is familiar with
the Code of Professional Responsibility ... "238 Few of the rules provide
specific sanctions against a student violating professional ethics,
presumably because it is the supervisor who will be deemed responsible
and subject to formal disciplinary procedures. However, many rules do
provide for "withdrawal of certification" of the student practitioner by
the judge of the court in which the student is practicing or by the certifying dean or supervising attorney. 39 Several states require that the
student subscribe an oath promising to "conduct myself strictly in ac24
cordance with all the terms and conditions of those rules.""
However,
such rules contain no specific sanctions.
The student practice rule of Hawaii is more specific. It requires the
supervisor to "provide professional guidance in every phase of such
practice with special attention to matters of professional responsibility
and legal ethics. 24. The rule provides that the student "shall be
24
governed by the rules of conduct applicable to lawyers generally,""
and
further provides that any court order designating an applicant as a law
of prison-should be allowed to act as 'next friend' to any person in the preparation of any paper or document or claim, so long as he does not hold himself out as
practicing law or as being a member of the Bar." Id. at 498 (Douglas, J., concurring).
234 See
23I

note 219 supra and accompanying text.
ABA MODEL STUDENT PRAC. R. II. B., reprinted in

COUNCIL ON LEGAL

EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STATE RULES PERMITTING THE
STUDENT PRACTICE OF LAW: COMPARISONS AND COMMENTS 29 (1970).
23 Id. at III. C.
2T

See, e.g., CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 42A(2)(b).

" See, e.g., CAL. ST. B. R. III (C)-Rules governing the Practical Training of
Lawyers; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 229(b)(7); W. VA. SUP. CT. APP. R. 6.000(III)(F).

See, e.g., CAL. ST. B. R. IV (B)-Rules governing the Practical Training of
Lawyers; CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 42A(5)(c); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 711(e)(3) & (4).
239

240 See, e.g., DEL. SUP. CT. R. 55(b).
241 HAWAII SUP. CT. R. 25.
242

Id.
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student intern "may be terminated by this court for cause consisting of
violation . . . of any act or omission which, in the part of an attorney,
would constitute misconduct and ground for discipline under Rule 16."2"3
Subsection 25.7 of the Rule articulates specific sanctions: "[Tlhe termination of practice shall be the exclusive sanction for disciplinary
infractions which occur during authorized practice; except that such
discipline infractions shall be considered by a court or agency authorized to entertain applications for the admission to the practice of law." '44
Thus, the Hawaiian rule not only provides for termination of a student's certification for cause, but specifically contemplates that
disciplinary infractions of a student will be a factor in admission to the
bar.
The requirement that terminations of certification be "for cause" is
significant in that it implies some sort of hearing procedure to determine good cause, although no such hearing procedure is specifically
mentioned in the rule. Even more significant is the fact that the student
is held personally responsible for his acts and omissions and is subject
to a possible denial of admission to the bar.
There seems to be some correlation between supervision requirements and the ethical responsibilities imposed. The ABA Model Rule requires the personal presence of the supervisor in any criminal matter
"in which the defendant does not have the right to assignment of
counsel under any constitutional provision, statutes, or rule of this
'
court."245
In turn, the supervisor assumes personal professional responsibility for the student's work. But in Hawaii where the student
assumes personal professional responsibility for his own acts, a student
court appearance without a supervisor is permitted where "the court or
tribunal consents. 246
The rationale for in-court supervision appears to be based on the
theory that where an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to
appointed counsel, compliance with the right to counsel ultimately rests
on the credentials of the licensed supervisor. This being so, it follows
that the ultimate professional responsibility also rests on the supervisor. It may be argued that where supervision is not required (even in
cases in which a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel), compliance with the canons of professional ethics should rest squarely on
the student.
The language of the various student practice rules appears to bear
out this theory.247 Accordingly, it may be argued that where the practice
rules specify who bears ultimate professional responsibility, such
responsibility rests on a student personally if the rule permits a student
243
244

Id.
Id.

245 ABA MODEL STUDENT PRAC.
146

HAWAII SUP. CT. R.

247 See

note 9 supra.

25.2(A).

R. II.A.2.
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court appearance without in-court supervision, but rests on the supervisor if in-court supervision is made a prerequisite to student practice.
In other words, the question of professional responsibility depends on
whether student counsel is himself considered as a sixth amendment
counsel.
Clearly, the best course would be for both student and supervisor to
consider themselves responsible. In any case, a student must certainly
assume that unprofessional acts committed under student practice will
be considered at the time of his application to the Bar.
C.

Malpractice

Regardless of whether a student is acting as sixth amendment
counsel, malpractice is a consideration. A student acting as sixth amendment counsel will be held to the same standards of effective assistance
as a licensed attorney.
At least two state's student practice rules require that the supervising attorney maintain a professional malpractice policy covering the
acts and omissions of the qualified law student. 48 Certainly it should not
be more difficult to cover a closely supervised student than to cover an
attorney's paralegal. In jurisdictions where in-court supervision is not
required, or where students are permitted greater independence from
the supervisor, the question arises as to whether a student needs his
own personal malpractice coverage." 9 Such questions can only be
resolved when a determination is made as to whether a student's representation is itself in compliance with the sixth amendment, or whether
compliance rests on the license and credentials of the supervising attorney.
The California Supreme Court in Perez held that there was sixth
amendment representation since the defendant was "at all times represented by both an actively participating supervising attorney and a
certified law student."2" Although the court did not consider whether
student representation without in-court supervision would have constituted sixth amendment representation, it may be surmised that supervision was a critical element. Nevertheless, the independent role of the
student, as evidenced by his being the only person present at the
counsel table, suggests that a personal malpractice policy for the student would be a prudent course.
D.

Student Attorney-Client Relationship

The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure communications between a lawyer and a client seeking professional advice. The
248 See,

e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-401.1 (1973); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.

320a-1 § 10 (1979).
249See KLEIN, supra note 4, at 919.
250 24 Cal. 3d at 144, 594 P.2d at 8, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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privilege has been extended to agents and subordinates of licensed
attorneys, such as paralegals, investigators, and law students. However,
the subordinate must be acting as an agent of the licensed attorney in
order to come within the privilege.
"
' a third year law
In Dabney v. Investment Corporationof America,25
student worked as an administrative assistance for Investment Corporation of America (ICA). After admission to the bar, the student was
called upon to give deposition testimony regarding his communications
with his client prior to his admission to the bar. The district court held
that since the law student did not appear to be working directly under
the supervision of a licensed attorney, the attorney-client privilege did
not extend to the student. The court rejected the arguments that "in all
respects save formal licensing .... [the student] was a qualified professional legal advisor, ' 2 2 and that the student "was performing the duties
of an attorney, was regarded and treated as an attorney, and was made
privy to certain confidential information that would have been disclosed
only to an attorney." ' The court therefore declined to extend the
privilege to law students in their own capacity, holding that "confidential legal communications with a law student were no more privileged
than similar communication with a blacksmith. ' 5 '
Students acting pursuant to a properly promulgated student practice
rule would be in a different category from the student in Dabney. If the
student is acting under the direct supervision of a licensed attorney, he
should certainly be considered as an agent of the licensed attorney and
therefore within the privilege. If, on the other hand, a student is considered to be sixth amendment counsel or is permitted to practice
without direct supervision, the privilege is probably compelled by the
sixth amendment. A student practicing pursuant to a properly promulgated student practice rule is, in effect, a limited licensee to whom
the privilege should extend in any case.
E.

Student Representation as Sixth Amendment Counsel

Perez was the first decision of a state's highest judicial body to
specifically approve student representation under supervision. As such
it constitutes part of the foundation for the legitimacy of student practice as sixth amendment counsel. Certainly, Perez will be cited in other
jurisdictions when issues concerning student representation arise and
its mandate for student representation is likely to be followed by other
jurisdictions in light of the pressures engendered by Argersinger and
its progeny, the favorable attitude toward student representation as
25182

F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

Id. at 465.
253

Id.

' Id. at 466.
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expressed by three Supreme Court justices, and the steady expansion of
clinical education in general.
Nevertheless, uncertainties remain. The "prediction" problems
engendered by Scott will continue to plague the student lawyer until a
more clearly definable standard of "right to counsel" can be devised.
The role and extent of supervision required to meet sixth amendment
standards still awaits judicial determination. It is unfortunate that in
most cases, such a determination can still only be made upon adjudication of an actual case in which student representation is directly or collaterally attacked. In states where advisory opinions are permitted,
such determinations should be encouraged. Student practice rules with
more specific sixth amendment references may also resolve some of the
uncertainties. Until then, the student can be assured that practice
within the confines of a properly promulgated student practice rule has
a substantial and legitimate legal foundation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The "predictive" analysis required by Argersinger, Scott and
Baldasar poses substantial obstacles to the student counsel. Extension
of the right to counsel to cases in which any jail is authorized would be a
clearly ascertainable standard and eliminate the uncertainties and problems associated with the predictive analysis now apparently required.
Such an extension would allow a student counsel to know in advance
whether his representation is gratuitous or whether it constitutes sixth
amendment counsel.
Student law practice under properly promulgated rules has a firm
legal foundation. However, student practice under the general supervision of a licensed attorney should be generally recognized as sixth
amendment representation in its own right, and not solely dependent
upon the license and credentials of the supervising attorney. Such
recognition should be limited to misdemeanors to avoid many of the
strong objections raised by the court of appeals and supreme court
dissent in Perez. Where student practice is not so recognized, hearing
procedures must be devised to ensure that the client and student can
determine the student's status in advance of trial, preferably before
appointment of student counsel. Waivers should be required pursuant to
student practice rules, but will be unnecessary for sixth amendment
purposes if student representation is recognized as meeting sixth
amendment requirements. In no case should waiver of counsel be used
as the basis of legitimacy for sixth amendment student representation.
A flat requirement of in-court supervision should not be a prerequisite to sixth amendment representation by student counsel. Indeed,
it is difficult to see how Justice Brennan's vision that "law students may
25
provide an important source of legal representation of the indigent""
...Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972).
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can be realized if a practicing attorney must always be present in court
with a student. Rather the requirement of in-court supervision should
be at the discretion of the trial court depending on the circumstances
and the type of case. Absent such a requirement imposed by the court,
the matter of in-court supervision should be left to the supervisor. Consequently, professional responsibility should be joint between the student and supervisor. The sanctions of termination of student certification for cause, and consideration of misconduct at time of bar admission
application should be imposed on all student practitioners and made
known to them.
Certification procedures for ensuring a minimum level of competence,
good moral character, and knowledge and understanding of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be established where none exist.
Such procedures should in fact be a prerequisite to sixth amendment
representation by a student.
A "limited license" issued pursuant to a properly promulgated student practice rule to students under the general supervision of a licensed
attorney, which would certify that a student has a minimum level of
competence, moral character, and knowledge of legal ethics to provide
sixth amendment representation in misdemeanor cases would be a positive format. Only on such a basis can Justice Brennan's vision of student
representation be realized and the threat of a collision between student
practice and the sixth amendment be avoided.

